



## Violent Conflict in Divided Societies

*The Case Study of Violent Conflict in Taraba State (2013 - 2015)*

**Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network  
(NCSAN)**



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# Violent Conflict in Divided Societies

## *The Case Study of Violent Conflict in Taraba State (2013 - 2015)*



*Taraba State, Nigeria. Source: NCSAN.*

## ***The Deeper Reality of the Violent Conflict in Taraba State and the Plight of Christians***

Nigeria Conflict and Security Analysis Network (NCSAN)

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## Disclaimers

**Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen:** Throughout this paper, the phrase *Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen* is used to designate those responsible for the attacks against indigenous Christian communities in Taraba State. However, the study is fully aware that in most reports across northern Nigeria, the term *Fulani herdsmen* is also in use. The choice of *Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen* is to accommodate the controversy regarding the identity of those allegedly involved in the attacks, in both formal and informal reports. However, it is not intended to target one particular socio-religious or ethnic group.

**Names not published for security reasons:** For security reasons, the names of those interviewed cannot be published in this report. The interviews were conducted with different categories of people considered as *'victims'*, *'witnesses'* or *'policy makers and influential community leaders'* in Taraba State. There was no distinction in gender, class, religion, ethnicity or political affiliation. Unfortunately, it was not possible to interview those considered as *'perpetrators'* either suspected, arrested or in custody to hear their own side of the story.

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## **Abstract: The deeper reality behind the violent conflict in Taraba State**

A previous study was conducted by the Nigeria Conflict and Security Analysis Network (NCSAN) in April 2015 entitled “Migration and Violent-Conflict in Divided Societies: Non-Boko Haram Violence against Christians in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria”. The findings from that study indicated a sophisticated and systematic attack on Christians around the Middle Belt Region, with patterns that show *ethnic cleansing*. The attack has displaced many thousands of civilians, mainly indigenous Christian farmers and led to the deaths of thousands of others, with hundreds of churches targeted or destroyed. Media and public commentators directly link this violent conflict to the issues of contestation over land, grazing fields and environmental resources in the context of environmental degradation and migration. The NCSAN decided to question this narrative by investigating specifically the conflict in Taraba State, from 2013 to 2015. Investigations revealed that at the official level, the conflict in Taraba State is still defined in terms of contestation over land. Yet, the data collected and the evidence obtained point to the contrary. There is a massive campaign to displace indigenous Christian farmers, from ethnic groups such as the Tiv, Jukun, Kuteb, Chamba, Panso, Kaambu and Bandawa in towns and villages of central, northern and southern Taraba State. Most worrying too is the fact that this violent conflict is going on simultaneously with the Boko Haram violence, and therefore, local and international attention is absent.

## Introduction

Since 2009, there has been a massive campaign of violence going on in north-eastern Nigeria, perpetrated by the so-called Boko Haram sect. The international media attention and publicity attained by the Boko Haram conflict has meant that other forms of violence in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria, particularly Taraba State, have not been adequately reported. Currently, Taraba State is being ravaged by a non-Boko Haram violent conflict. The southern part of the state, which is predominantly Christian, is the worst hit, with mass internal displacement due to attacks by Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen on Christian communities, particularly those located in areas close to Benue state, previously considered as safe havens. These include the towns and villages of Wukari, Donga, Isha-gogo, Tseke, Gidin-Dorowa, Nyamhina, Gborbegha, Borkono, Takum, Jinuwa-Nyife, Ibi and Gbogudo. There is also internal migration towards Jalingo, the Taraba State capital, as thousands of indigenous farming communities, mostly Christian, scramble for safety. Some commentators link the conflict to environmental degradation, internal migration and contestation over land between indigenes and settlers. Others argue that the violent conflict in Taraba State is due to the internal politics of the state, defined by religious and ethnic narratives. To test these narratives, the NCSAN team conducted a four month (April – July 2015) in-depth research and investigation into the violent conflict in Taraba State, looking at the period from 2013 - 2015. The study agrees that Taraba State has a history of inter-tribal and inter-ethnic conflicts, yet these conflicts have been understudied. In the light of new evidence, and based on data collected within the period of this study, research suggests that, beyond the environmental and political narratives, there is an underlying ideological framework aiming to displace indigenous Christian communities, especially in the southern part, and to enhance Islamic influence in a predominantly Christian area.

The ongoing conflict in Taraba State is a complex phenomenon where thousands of Christians as well as Muslims are being killed and displaced. In most cases, the conflict is oversimplified, under-researched or completely neglected. For some of the government officials, both at the local, state and federal levels, including some international agencies, the conflict is either about land, politics or directly linked to the ongoing Boko Haram conflict. The purpose of this research is to underscore the underlying internal factors motivating the conflict in Taraba. The study questions the political, environmental and Boko Haram narratives, arguing that intrinsic to this conflict is a long term agenda to dominate a state seen as a Christian majority state within northeastern Nigeria. This undertaking is significant because the conflict in Taraba State has been going on for far too long without much national or international attention. Secondly, the indigenous Christian farmers, particularly the Tiv ethnic group, have been systematically victimized, to such an extent that questions are beginning to be raised as to whether such atrocities can be termed genocide. The reason being that the Tiv ethnic group is 99% Christian. They occupy the major parts of central and southern Taraba which is the target for Hausa-Fulani Muslim dominance. Historically, the Tiv ethnic group has been at the forefront of opposition to the Hausa-Fulani dominance of the area. For instance in the 1860s, the Emir of Muri, Burba dan Hamman (c.1869-1873) attacked – albeit unsuccessfully - the Tiv ethnic groups in Taraba because they rejected Islam in favor of Christianity.<sup>1</sup> In addition to other ethnic groups with Christian populations, the Tiv are considered a major threat to the Hausa-Fulani ambition to dominate Taraba State. Therefore, this research has examined the underlying narratives

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<sup>1</sup> Abdulkadir, Mohammed Sanni, 2011. "Islam in the non-Muslim Areas of Northern Nigeria, c. 1600 – 1960". In: Ilorin Journal of Religious Studies, (IJURELS) 1(1):1-20, p. 7.




regarding the ongoing conflict in Taraba State.<sup>2</sup> It has also deepened the authors' commitment to expose both the persecution of Christians in areas like Taraba State (where the conflict is neglected both by local actors and the international community) and the efforts of Hausa-Fulani Muslim hegemony to continue with the historical legacies of their forefathers and the Islamic principle of *darul Islam* to conquer other non-Muslim territories of the north. Additionally, the research report is significant for the Nigerian government and its partners in the international community to construct policies that will ensure equal rights and religious freedom for all, using Taraba State as a springboard. Lack of research means lack of policy strategies for effective conflict management and religious freedom. It therefore becomes necessary to examine the nature of the conflict in Taraba, expose the atrocities against Christians and draw international attention to the plight of Christian victims.

### Methodology and limitations of the study

To carry out this research, the NCSAN team relied on two methodologies. First, the team produced a video documentary interviewing victims, government officials and traditional rulers. The places covered in the video documentary included central Taraba (Bali, Kurmi, Mutum Biyu and Sardauna LGAs); Southern Taraba (Wukari, Takum, Donga and Ibi LGAs); the border between Taraba and Benue (Ugba, Jootar, Agasha, Guma and Zaki-Biam towns); the border between Southern Adamawa and Cameroon (Toungo, Kiri, Naya and Naade, all in Toungo LGA) where hundreds of indigenous Christian Tiv farmers displaced by the conflict have settled. The issues raised in the documentary were verified or debunked by the evidence collected on the field.

Map of Nigeria showing Taraba State, and map of Taraba State showing the number of local government areas (LGAs):



Sources: [http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/nigeria\\_map.htm](http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/nigeria_map.htm) & [www.nigerianmuse.com/...maps.../maps-of-various-states-and-their-local](http://www.nigerianmuse.com/...maps.../maps-of-various-states-and-their-local)

<sup>2</sup> The Analytical, 2015. "Nigeria: Migration and Violent Conflict in Divided Societies". April, 2015. <http://theanalytical.org/nigeria-migration-and-violent-conflict-in-divided-societies> (accessed August 8, 2015).

The second methodology was a field research conducted in the same areas mentioned above. The field research relied on interviews conducted with victims and the internally displaced people. It also examined newspaper reports, the reports of local organizations, victim groups and networks, community associations and religious bodies who documented the nature of atrocities at the time of the conflict. For instance, the NCSAN team obtained documents of people killed and churches/presbyteries destroyed from the office of Justice, Peace and Development Commission, Catholic Diocese of Jalingo, the Tiv Cultural and Social Association (TCSA), Taraba State, The Tiv Leadership Council, Bali and Human Rights Commission Abuja. Efforts to obtain documents from the Muslim Council of Taraba State on the estimated number of Muslims killed and mosques destroyed did not yield any results. In addition, other important personalities were interviewed but cannot be mentioned for security reasons.

It is necessary to concede that the purpose of this research is not to contest established facts regarding the nature of the violent activities going on in Taraba State. If anything, the research broadens the horizon of ongoing discussions with current on-ground data and evidence from Taraba State. In addition, it provides fresh contextual analysis of the conflict in Jalingo, demonstrating that differences in historical periods do not mean that grievances and conflict frameworks have disappeared. The research is an original attempt to bring the violent conflict in Taraba State to international attention. The research is divided into four parts: the first part examines the meaning of violent conflict in a divided society and how it relates to Taraba State. The second part traces the history of Taraba State in order to demonstrate the ethnic and religious divisions as they are constituted today and to showcase the different levels of conflict. Part three presents the nature of the ongoing conflict, looking at the period 2013 - 2015. It provides evidence that shows Christians, particularly the Tiv, Jukun, Kuteb, Chamba, Panso, Kaambu and Bandawa Christians in Taraba State have been identified as being some of the victims. Part four is an analysis of the motivations behind this conflict. Central to this analysis is the ideological agenda of Islam, executed by the Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen, to dominate a Christian area.

## **Part One: Understanding the nature of divided societies and violent conflict**

According to Pfaff-Czarnecka, societies can be considered generally as traditional administrative units with a perceived sense of common ancestry and memory.<sup>3</sup> In this context, divided societies, though within one nation, might be “different in culture, separate in institutions, unequal in power and privilege, or disagreeing on fundamental issues.”<sup>4</sup> Sometimes these societies can be divided along ethnic or religious lines where the state is traditionally affiliated with the dominant group.<sup>5</sup> Such divisions determine not only the way groups perceive each other within the nation, but also influence the manner in which citizens relate to each other, contest for power, space and influence,

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<sup>3</sup> Pfaff-Czarnecka, Joanna, “Democratisation and nation-building in divided societies”, [http://www.academia.edu/1341595/Democratisation\\_and\\_nation-building\\_in\\_divided\\_societies](http://www.academia.edu/1341595/Democratisation_and_nation-building_in_divided_societies) (pdf accessed 15 July 2015).

<sup>4</sup> Smootha, Sammy and Hanf, Theodor, 1992. “The Diverse Modes of Conflict-Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies”, *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, XXXIII, p. 1-6.

<sup>5</sup> Hasisi,Badi, 2008. “Police, Politics, and Culture in a Deeply Divided Society”, *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 98(3):1119-1146, p. 1124.



as well as the manner in which resources are distributed and shared. Yiftachel argues that deeply divided societies are societies that are composed of non-assimilating ethnic groups, pre-occupied by their historical memory and cultural affiliation to the homeland. Thus, such societies tend to promote goals of cultural and regional autonomy which lead to more ethnic conflicts.<sup>6</sup>

Conflict on the other hand is generally conceived within a social context. It is seen as a social phenomenon that emerges in the process of human relationships: relationships to authority, political space, land, economic and material resources.<sup>7</sup> According to Oyeniyi, conflict usually occurs primarily as a result of a clash between parties, when two or more parties perceive that their interests are incompatible, express hostile attitudes, or pursue their interests through actions that damage the other parties' interest.<sup>8</sup> The interests could be related to resources, power-sharing, community identity, sense of exclusion and threat to religious affiliation.<sup>9</sup> Consequently, violent conflict occurs when parties seek to attain their goals by violent means, and try to dominate or destroy the opposing parties' ability to pursue their own interests.<sup>10</sup> The violence that comes with opposed interests is contingent upon factors such as the imposition of religious supremacy, competition over territory, traditional institutions, natural resources and the levers of political power. Other factors may include the kind of opposing parties such as ethnic, religious or regional communities, states as well as political factions. Another factor can be the type of power available in the hands of these parties: nuclear power, political dominance, conventional war, terrorism, coups, repression, genocide, gross human rights violations, ethnic cleansing. The final motivating factor can be the suitable location or territory available for killing and destruction, i.e. whether the geographic scope is at the border region, on the fringe, or it is inter-communal, international or linked to border disputes.<sup>11</sup>

Scholars such as Kaplan, Jackson and Rosberg argue that African societies are considered multi-ethnic, deeply divided and easily sucked into violent conflict.<sup>12</sup> Yet it is important to mention that recent events in Europe suggest that, even in the modern liberal democracies of Europe, the sense of nationalism, history and memory still influences contestation over power-sharing and economic control of resources, though not as violently as in Africa. This is evident in the 2014 Scottish Referendum, piloted by the Scottish National Party (SNP) to break-away from the United Kingdom, as well as the search for an independent Catalonia in Spain.<sup>13</sup> In Africa the introduction of multi-party democracy fertilized divisions within most African societies and created new layers of religious,

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<sup>6</sup> Yiftachel, Oren, 1994. "The Dark Side of Modernism: Planning as a Control of an Ethnic Minority", Oxford: Blackwell, p. 218.

<sup>7</sup> Rummel R. J., 1975. "Understanding Conflict and War, The Dynamic Psychological Field", Vol. 3, Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications.

<sup>8</sup> Oyeniyi, Adeleye, 2011. "Conflict and Violence in Africa: Causes, Sources and Types", Transcend Media Service, 28 February 2011.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Kaplan, Robert D., 1994. "The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and Disease are rapidly destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet", *The Atlantic*, February 1, 1994.

<sup>11</sup> Creative Associates, 2014. "Conflict Prevention, A Guide, Understanding Conflict and Peace", <http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com/.../ghai/understanding.htm> (accessed 13 June 2014).

<sup>12</sup> Jackson, Robert H. and Rosberg, Carl G., 1982. "Why Africa's Weak States Persists: The Empirical and the Juridical" in *Statehood*, 35(1):1-24.

<sup>13</sup> Connolly, Christopher, 2013. "Independence in Europe: Secession, Sovereignty, and the European Union" in *Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law*, 24(1):51-105.

ethno-regional and political loyalties.<sup>14</sup> Consequently, Nigeria's return to multiparty democracy in 1999 reignited the Islamic drive to dominate and Islamize other parts of the country that are non-Muslim majority, particularly in the north. In this context, Taraba State is considered a multi-ethnic society where tribes and communities are sharply divided along racial, cultural, linguistic and religious lines. This division is seen in historical violent conflict between the Tiv and the Jukun, which has been recurring since 1959,<sup>15</sup> or the Jukun, Kutep and Chamba ethnic groups in the quest to clarify who ascends the throne of the Jukun Monarchy and controls Takum. The source of the conflict could be traced to the 1914 amalgamation which led to the merging of the different ethnic groups that initially existed separately. The violent conflict which surfaced in 1997, 1999 and 2001 (underscored by all groups clamoring for a separate chiefdom) led to the killing of over 200 people with many more injured, and to the destruction of property worth 300 million naira.<sup>16</sup> Recent events in Taraba State indicate that the violent conflict has moved beyond ethnic contestation. It is more about the Islamic agenda to dominate and Islamize Taraba, a Christian majority state in the northeastern region of Nigeria.

## Part Two: The history of Taraba State

Taraba State is one of the 36 states of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It is named after River Taraba, a river that transverses the central part of the state.<sup>17</sup> Intense military politics under the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida led to the creation of Taraba State out of the defunct Gongola State on 27 August 1991.<sup>18</sup> Taraba State is bounded in the west by Plateau State and Benue State and on the eastern border by Adamawa State and the Republic of Cameroon. On the northern border are Bauchi and Gombe states. Taraba has been rightly nicknamed nature's gift to the nation because of the abundant natural resources the state is endowed with. The agrarian nature and rich alluvial soil found in most parts of the state makes Taraba conducive for cultivating all types of food and cash crops such as cassava, yams, potatoes, cocoyam, rice, maize, coffee, tea and cocoa. The state has vast lush grassland that supports cattle grazing, while the various rivers/lakes hold great potential for the development of fisheries.<sup>19</sup> The natural endowments of Taraba State, particularly in the central and southern parts of the state, are attractive to migrating herdsmen and pastoralists. More importantly, it is an economic gateway to southern Nigeria from the northeast for the transportation of cattle and other farm products to the south. Consequently, there have been increased, but undocumented levels of internal migrations from the far north, including the border areas into central and southern Taraba, where Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen come in search of grazing fields and for other economic reasons.

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<sup>14</sup> Norris, Pippa, 2005. "Stable democracy and good governance in divided societies: Do power-sharing institutions work?", Paper for presentation at the International Studies Association 46th annual convention, Panel SC04 Political Institutions and Ethnic Politics, 1.45-3.30 on Saturday 5th March 2005, Honolulu.

<sup>15</sup> Okereke, C. Nna-Emeka, 2012. "Nigerian State and Management of Communal Conflicts in the Middle Belt" in: *Nigeria and the World: A Bolaji Akinyemi Revisited*, edited by Bola A. Akinterinwa, Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.

<sup>16</sup> Ojo, Emmanuel O., "A Survey of Ethno-religious Crisis and its Implication to Nigeria's Nascent Democracy" in *Journal of Sustainable Democracy in Africa* Volume 12, Number 2, 2010, p. 188.

<sup>17</sup> Taraba State Of Nigeria in [www.ngex.com/Nigeria/Placis](http://www.ngex.com/Nigeria/Placis) (accessed 30 March 2015).

<sup>18</sup> Alkali, M..N., Monguno, A.K.and Mustafa, B.S.,, 2012. "Overview of Islamic Actors in North-Eastern Nigeria", Nigeria Research Network (NRN) Oxford Department of International Development Queen Elizabeth House University of Oxford, Working Paper No. 2, January 2013, p. 4.

<sup>19</sup> Taraba State Government in [www.tarabagov.ng](http://www.tarabagov.ng) (accessed 30 March 2015).

Taraba State has sixteen LGAs, and according to the 2006 census figures released by the national population commission, the total population figure of Taraba State stands at 2,300,736. Even though religion is never part of the census count in Nigeria, research carried out has shown that about 55% are Christians, 32% Muslims, 12% African Traditional Religion adherents and 1% self-acclaimed free thinkers.<sup>20</sup> Yet these figures remain highly disputed.<sup>21</sup> Christians are found in northern, central and southern Taraba in very high numbers. The population of Muslims in Taraba State is understandably linked to the population of Hausa-Fulani Muslim settlers, mostly around central Taraba State, which has steadily grown over the years since the colonial period.<sup>22</sup> Other factors responsible for this population growth include migration within Taraba, and migration from without because of the favorable environmental conditions of Taraba State compared to most northern states, as well as its high birth rate.<sup>23</sup> Some Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen move in and out of the state seasonally, with some finally settling down, especially at the border between Taraba State and Cameroon. Due to these factors it is difficult to calculate the actual Hausa-Fulani population and 32% is seen as a *representative figure*. In terms of inter-religious relationships, interviews conducted in Wukari LGA indicate that adherents of the African Traditional Religion tend to align more with the Christians who they consider more tolerant towards them and are also from the same ethnic group.<sup>24</sup>

Although there is no current quantitative research in Taraba State to verify this perspective in the above interviews, such an opinion is not unconnected with the general view that the Aku of Wukari (the traditionalist chief of Wukari) is more favorably disposed to Christians. This must be seen against the background that most Muslims within the state are of Hausa/Fulani extraction and are viewed as settlers, a point which many will disagree with. It is also fair to concede that some of the conflicts that have occurred in Taraba since the creation of the state are linked to inter-tribal and inter-ethnic contestations. Yet, evidence from the current conflict goes beyond this narrative. Additionally, considering the reality of mutual distrust between Christians and Muslims in Taraba State, gubernatorial elections since 1999 have always been influenced by religious affiliation in the state. As such, voting patterns in 1999, 2007 and 2015 have all been dictated by religion and the contestation of political power between Christians and Muslims. Since Taraba is a Christian majority state, Christians have always been elected governors in the period 1999 - 2015. However, this is not to suggest that religion was the only factor that got Christians elected as governors (listed below), nor that subsequent elections need follow the same pattern.

- ❖ Jolly Nyame (29 May 1999 – 29 May 2007). A cleric of United Methodist Church and originating from Zing LGA. He was again elected as executive governor of the state on the platform of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP).
- ❖ Danbaba Danfulani Suntai (29 May 2007 – 29 May 2015). Another Christian that was democratically elected as executive governor of the state on the platform of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). Governor Danbaba comes from Bali LGA.

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<sup>20</sup> Adamu, Abdulkarkindo and Ben, Alupse, "Migration And Violent Conflict in Divided Societies", Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN), Working Paper No.1, Abuja, Nigeria p. 22.

<sup>21</sup> Some analysts say the percentage of Christians could well be up to 75% Christians (at least before the forced migration).

<sup>22</sup> Abdulkadir, Mohammed Sanni, 2011. "Islam in the Non-Muslim Areas of Northern Nigeria, c. 1600 – 1960", Ilorin Journal of Religious Studies, (IJOURS) 1(1):1-20.

<sup>23</sup> Danejo, Bello Umar et al., 2015. "Socio-Economic Factors Influencing Rural-Urban Migration in Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State, Nigeria", ARPJ Journal of Science and Technology, 5(4):201-206.

<sup>24</sup> Interview with a resident of Wukari on 18 February 2015.

- ❖ Darius Dickson Ishaku (29 May 2015 – till date). He is a Christian from Takum LGA of the state. He is elected as executive governor of Taraba State on the platform of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP).

Despite the current levels of violent conflict in Taraba State, there are hardly any records of violent conflicts, ethnic or religious, taking place during the pre-independence times in territories considered part of Taraba State today.<sup>25</sup> In fact, there is evidence of ethnic collaboration between the indigenous Jukun and Tiv groups to ward off Fulani invasion, before the arrival of colonial administration. In 1866, during the reign of Aku Agbumanu (1861-1866), the Fulani rulers of Wase and Misau declared war on Wukari. The Tiv were on hand to help the Jukun defeat the Fulani invaders. Similarly, during the reign of Awudumanu Abiten (1871-1903), Mallam Dankaro, the Gobir raider, invaded and terrorized Wukari town but was defeated by the Jukun tribe with the help of the Tiv people. The worst of these conflicts took place in 1906 when a violent conflict ensued between the Hausa-Fulani traders and the Jukun at Abinsi. The Jukun (in collaboration with the Tiv) fought the Hausa-Fulani traders which resulted in 76 Hausa-Fulani traders being killed and 163 captured. In addition, the canteen of the Royal Niger Company was completely burned down. Lord Lugard, then governor general of northern Nigeria, sent forces to rescue the Hausa-Fulani traders and punish the perpetrators.<sup>26</sup> By 1960, post-independence political arrangements and the creation of new states led to hostilities between different ethnic groups within Taraba. For instance, sixteen years after independence, the southern part of the state was embroiled in violent conflicts over the creation of new administrative jurisdictions. Vaaseh explains that “trouble started in 1976 when Benue and Gongola states were created. The Tiv and the Jukun ethnic groups felt the states were created for them. Consequently, it was alleged that the Jukun ethnic group led by the then administrator of Wukari Division, Mallam Ibrahim Sangari led a band of arsonists to attack and burn down Tiv villages. They argued that since Benue was created for the Tiv, Gongola was created for the Jukuns; hence the Tiv were to relocate to Benue state.”<sup>27</sup>

Between 1990 and 1991, the Tiv and Jukun fought fiercely, killing people and destroying property wantonly. Five years before the creation of Taraba State in 1991, the Tiv ethnic group, which is 99% Christian, petitioned the Gongola State government over their socio-political exclusion in the yet to be Taraba State. In a memorandum dated 13 February 1986, the Tiv ethnic group wrote to Col. Yohanna Madaki, then governor of Gongola State, on various issues such as: the non-recognition of Tiv as indigenes of the state, non-recognition of Tiv traditional rulers, denial of employment opportunities at the local government level, denial of scholarship opportunities, change of names of Tiv towns and settlements to Jukun or Hausa names etc.<sup>28</sup> Violence also happened in 2001 that claimed lives from Wukari to Ibi, Gassol and Donga LGAs. Gudaku reported that “in 1995 and between 1998 and 1999, violent conflict erupted between the Jukun/Chamba and the Kutep ethnic groups in Takum.”<sup>29</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Avav, Ter-Rumun and Myegba, Mson, 1992. “The Dream to Conquer: Story of Jukun – Tiv Conflict”, Swem Kalagbe Series, No. 1, p. 5.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Vaaseh, Godwin A., , 2013. “Indigene or Settler: Tiv-Jukun Geopolitics” in “The Military Invasion of Zaki-Biam”, edited by Terhemba Wuam and Elijah Terdoo Ikpanoor, Makurdi, Aboki Publishers, p. 13.

<sup>28</sup> Avav, Ter-Rumun and Myegba, Mson, 1992. “The Dream to Conquer: Story of Jukun – Tiv Conflict”, Swem Kalagbe Series, No. 1, p. 33.

<sup>29</sup> Gudaku, Benjamin Tyavkase, 2007. “Agony of Crisis: A Challenge to National Development and Integration”, Jos: Fab Educational Books, p. 63.

## Part Three: Data presentation of current violent conflict between Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen and indigenous Christian farmers in Taraba State, 2013 – 2015

### Historical context

Since Nigeria's return to multi-party democracy in 1999, violent conflict of all kinds has intensified around the country. Massive state failure and the loss of faith in the military and political class forced ordinary Nigerians to shift their loyalty away from the state to ethno-regional and religious networks to protect community interests and seek for alternative political authority or systems. The Yoruba in the south-west revived The Odudua People's Congress, (OPC).<sup>30</sup> The Igbo ethnic group under the aegis of Ohanaeze Ndigbo resurrected the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and called for secession.<sup>31</sup> The Ijaw Youth Council of the Niger Delta region issued the Kaiama Declaration, laying claim to all resources within its territory and demanding the withdrawal of Nigerian occupying forces from Ijawland.<sup>32</sup> In northern Nigeria, the influence of the 1979 Iranian revolution had grown unchecked.<sup>33</sup> Iranian financial support inspired Nigeria's Shia population to increase from less than 1 per cent in 1979 to around 5 - 10 per cent of Nigeria's Muslim population after the return to multiparty democracy. The growth of Shia Islam in Nigeria was spearheaded by Ibrahim al-Zakzaky, the leader of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN). Al-Zakzaky graduated from Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria, Kaduna in the 1970s and as an activist in political Islam he was famous for his ideology that Islam is an alternative model to socialism and capitalism. He supported Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979<sup>34</sup> and adopted the symbolism and rhetoric of Shi'a Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini.<sup>35</sup>

With financial support from Iran, Al-Zakzaky then founded the IMN and went on "recruitment tours" to northern Nigerian universities to showcase the Iranian revolution.<sup>36</sup> In addition to this, financial support to build Islamic schools and provide social services helped the spread of Shia Islam.<sup>37</sup> During protests, portraits of Iranian leaders Khomeini and Khamenei, together with Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hizbullah, were held aloft, while American and Israeli flags were burned. Nigerian Shias were sent to train in Iran to attack US and Israeli government and civilian targets in Lagos.<sup>38</sup> For

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<sup>30</sup> Nolte, Insa, (2007), "Ethnic Vigilantes and the State: The Oodua People's Congress in South-Western Nigeria", *International Relations*, 21:219-245

<sup>31</sup> Meagher, Kate. (2007). "Hijacking Civil Society: The Inside Story of Bakassi Boys Vigilante Group of South-Eastern Nigeria", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 45:89-106.

<sup>32</sup> Dolezal, Scott. (2000). "The Systematic Failure to Interpret Article IV of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is There a Public Emergency in Nigeria?" *American University International Law Review* 15 (5):1163-1209, p. 1194.

<sup>33</sup> Neria, Jacques, 2013. "Iranian Shiite Terror Cell in Nigeria Followed a Familiar Pattern." *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs*, <http://jcpa.org/article/iranian-shiite-terror-cell-in-nigeria-followed-a-familiar-pattern/#sthash.m8E84CTK.dpuf> (accessed 12 June 2015).

<sup>34</sup> Usman, Ibrahim, 2012. "Zakzaky – Ahmadu Bello University's Last Alumnus Standing," *Daily Trust*, 5 December 2012.

<sup>35</sup> "The Islamic Awakening: Islamic Struggle, Correct Path to Lasting Success," *Islamicmovement.org*, undated. Alao, Abiodun, 2009. "Islamic Radicalization and Violence in Northern Nigeria", a Country Report, p. 16-19. [www.securityanddevelopment.org](http://www.securityanddevelopment.org) (accessed 11 June 2015).

<sup>36</sup> Thurston, Alexander, 2009. "Interactions between Northern Nigeria and the Arab World in the Twentieth Century," *Georgetown University Masters Thesis*, 2009.

<sup>37</sup> Zenn, Jacob, 2013. *The Islamic Movement and Iranian Intelligence Activities in Nigeria*, CTC Sentinel, 24 October 2013.

<sup>38</sup> Akinsuyi, Yemi and Oyedele, Damilola, 2013. "Iran Linked to Terrorist Plot to Kill IBB, Dasuki", *ThisDayLive*, 21 February 2013, <http://www.thisdaylive.com> (accessed 30 November 2014); *Islamic Movement in Nigeria*. (2009) "Tafiyar Sheikh El-Zakzaky Jamhuriyar Musulunci ta Iran Cikin Hotuna", 30 May 2009.

instance in February 2013, the Nigerian State Security Service arrested Abdulahi Mustapha, the leader of the Shia group in Ilorin, Kwara State, and his two assistants, Suleiman Olayinka Saka and Saheed Aderemi. A fourth member of the group, Bunyamin Yusuf, escaped.<sup>39</sup> Abdulahi was accused of making several trips to Iran, first in 2006 where he received Islamic education and was familiarised with the working of Iranian terrorist networks.<sup>40</sup> He returned to Iran in 2011 and trained in the use of AK-47 assault rifles as well as the production, supply and detonation of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). His military trainers from the Iranian Quds Force instructed him to hunt for intelligence on hotels and other public places frequented by Israelis and Americans as potential targets for attack.<sup>41</sup> Abdulahi confessed working with the Iranians and receiving no less than US\$30,000 to carry out operations in different parts of Nigeria. To help start a business as a cover, he also received three payments in foreign currencies, namely US\$4,000, €3,500 and US\$20,000. Before he was arrested, evidence suggests he had taken photographs of the Israeli Cultural Centre in Ikoyi and sent them to his Iranian network<sup>42</sup> as a possible target for attack in addition to other potential targets like USAID, Max, Zim International Shipping Company, A A Consulting, Peace Corps and the Jewish Cultural Centre (Chabad) in Lagos.<sup>43</sup> A few months after this, Abdulahi's associates, an Iranian Azim Aghajani and an unnamed Nigerian were sentenced to five years in prison for smuggling weapons to West Africa.<sup>44</sup> The growing influence of Shia Islam in northern Nigeria indicates the depth of sectarian competition between Shia-Sunni Islam and the strategic considerations of both Saudi Arabia and Iran regarding Nigeria as an Islamic power house in Africa. Ideologically, it exposes the level of ongoing radicalization in northern Nigeria and the Islamist threat to Nigeria's identity as a secular state, linked to the rejection of western civilization which is perceived as trying to undermine and ultimately destroy Islam.

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<http://www.harkarmusulunci.org/data.asp?id=101010&lang=1> (accessed 14 November 2014).

<sup>39</sup> Community Security Trust (CST), 2013. "Terrorist Plots Against Jews and Israelis Abroad, Project Protecting the Jewish Community", August 1, 2013. <https://cst.org.uk/docs/Recent%20Terrorist%20Plots%20Against%20...> (accessed 8 July 2015).

<sup>40</sup> Ukpong, Ubong, 2013. "Plot to Kill IBB, Dasuki Foiled...As SSS busts Iranian-backed Terror Group", The Sun, 21 February 2013.

<sup>41</sup> Karmon, Ely, 2013. "Out of Iran, Into Africa: Hezbollah's Scramble for Africa", Haaretz, 17 June 2013. <http://www.haaretz.com/news/features/.premium-1.530327> (accessed 8 July 2015)

<sup>42</sup> Ibeh, Nnenna, 2013. "Iranian militants send Nigerian terrorist after Americans, Israelis in Lagos; target ex head of state – SSS", Premium Times, 21 February 2013

<sup>43</sup> Ukpong, Ubong, 2013. Plot to Kill IBB, Dasuki Foiled...As SSS busts Iranian-backed Terror Group, The Sun, 21 February 2013.

<sup>44</sup> Karmon, Ely, 2013. Op. cit.





30 August 2007 – Hizbollah followers of Nigerian Shiite Sheikh Zakzaky in Zaria (Northwest Abuja) - Source: <http://jcpa.org/article/iranian-shiite-terror-cell-in-nigeria-followed-a-familiar-pattern/#sthash.5yjzHAMk.dpuf> (accessed 12 June 2015)

With Nigeria's return to multi-party democracy in 1999, Ahmed Sani, at the time governor of Zamfara State (1999-2007), took advantage of a loosely crafted clause in the constitution that allowed a state to extend the jurisdiction of its sharia courts and declared Zamfara a sharia state as part of his campaign promises.<sup>45</sup> By September 1999, he announced the new measures amid great excitement which included rigid segregation of the sexes, and prohibition of immoral acts such as prostitution and the consumption of alcohol.<sup>46</sup> In addition to a man whose hand was amputated for cattle theft and a woman lashed 100 times for rape claims, the immediate cost was further conflict across northern Nigeria, with Kaduna alone recording 1,295 deaths. This also led to reprisal attacks against northerners in the largely Christian south. More northern states adopted sharia law. Incidences like Nigeria's support for America's invasion of Afghanistan and the al-Qaeda attack in New York easily led to violent conflict, especially in Plateau State.<sup>47</sup> Within this political context, Muslim politicians revitalized their support for Islamic sects, to be seen by majority Muslims as supporting Islamic agenda, but at the same time to gather support for their individual political ambitions. Consequently, political thugs mostly aligned with Islamic sects such as *Sara-Suka* in Gombe state, *Banu Isra'il* in Taraba State, *Ecomog* in Borno and *Yan Shinko* in Adamawa State, became very active in furthering both Islamic agenda and the political ambitions of their sponsors.<sup>48</sup> Both Boko Haram (at least at the very beginning) and the Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen in Taraba State are seen to be supported in

<sup>45</sup> Last, Murray. 2008. "The Search for Security in Muslim Northern Nigeria", *Journal for International African Institute*, 78(1):41-63, p. 60.

<sup>46</sup> Iliffe, John, 2011. "Obasanjo, Nigeria and the World", Suffolk, UK: James Currey, p. 190.

<sup>47</sup> Jacob, Ray Ikechukwu and Saad, Suhana 2011. "Ethnic conflict in Nigeria: Constitutional Law and the Dilemma of Decision-making", *Malaysia Journal of Society and Space*, 7(2):28-36, p. 33.

<sup>48</sup> Ayuba, Haruna and Hamman, Jumba Ahmadu, 2011. "Politics of Thuggery and Patronage in the North-Eastern Nigeria". *Academic Research International* 1(1):115.

the same manner.<sup>49</sup> However, while Boko Haram seems to have received a lot of local and international attention, the atrocities of the Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen against indigenous Christian farmers in Taraba State was ignored nationally and relegated to the background. Below is a presentation of the data on the atrocities committed by Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen in Taraba State between December 2013 and July 2015.

### **Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen's atrocities in Taraba State December 2013 to July 2015**

**This chapter presents data on different categories of violence against Christians by Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen. It is important to realize that no claim is made that this data is complete. The researchers estimate that the information gathered on violence could be 50% of the total violence committed. This means the situation is in all probability worse than the data suggest. The incompleteness of the data is caused by two factors: the researchers were not able to go everywhere for security reasons; and not everyone they met was able to talk, also for security reasons. As far as violence against Muslims is concerned, the researchers have diligently searched for data, but no one was willing to talk or to share documented information.**

**The researchers estimate that more than 70% of the atrocities committed took place in the period November 2014 – July 2015 because of the elections. With the elections coming up, the atrocities intensified.**

#### **Taraba Atrocities Data (TAD)**

For the purpose of simplicity, it is important to clarify that the data collected is referred to as Taraba Atrocities Data (TAD) 2013 – 2015, divided into three categories: **TAD – Category 1, TAD – Category 2 and TAD – Category 3** which cover the number of people killed or injured, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and IDP camps, and the number of churches and properties destroyed respectively. The data was collected over the period of four months April – July 2015. The Nigerian Conflict and Security Analysis Network (NCSAN) set up two teams that aided the data collection. The first team was made up of the members of NCSAN, independent freelance journalists and local contacts with no political affiliation and representing no ethnic or religious interest. The second team included members of NCSAN, community, traditional and religious leaders as well as some representatives of religious groups, youth organizations and civil societies in Taraba State. The data was collected in areas that covered Taraba State, particularly southern and central Taraba where the conflict has been very intense. Other areas include the boundary between Taraba and Benue states, Taraba and Adamawa states, Taraba and Plateau states as well as the Nigeria-Cameroon border region in southern Adamawa where thousands of indigenous Christian farmers displaced from Taraba State are taking refuge. Both teams visited hundreds of villages, and spoke to victims, IDPs, traditional and religious leaders, civil society organizations, government functionaries and observed the level of destruction and atrocities committed by the Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen against indigenous Christian farmers in Taraba State. The data collected and the resultant findings provide a framework and platform for questioning the narrative of environmental degradation and resource contestation peddled by many as the reason for the conflict.

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<sup>49</sup> Interview, member of ECWA Church, Jalingo, Taraba State, 9 June 2015.

### People killed or injured

**TAD – Category 1: Estimated number of people killed or injured from December 2013 – 14 July 2015 by Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen in Taraba State.** This category deals specifically with the estimated number of people killed, either Christians or Muslims, in central and southern senatorial districts of Taraba State covering seven LGAs: Gassol, Bali and Gashaka (central Taraba), and Donga, Takum, Wukari and Ibi (southern Taraba). In this category, two different sets of data were produced. The first set of data was collected by the team composed of NCSAN members, independent freelance journalists and local contacts. This team interviewed over 300 people and collected data in different villages and local communities in around central and southern Taraba, where the violent conflict has been most intense. The team was led by a veteran journalist resident in Jalingo, the Taraba State capital, and most of the data was obtained from prominent traditional leaders, testimonies of community members as well as victims. The results of the data collected are presented below.

### Results first team

#### Overview - Estimated number of Christians killed and injured in seven LGAs (Taraba State)

LGA	No. of people killed	Religion
Bali	364	Christians
Donga	61	Christians
Gashaka	60	Christians
Gassol	240	Christians
Ibi	140	Christians
Takum	94	Christians
Wukari	200	Christians
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,159</b>	

From the available statistics presented by the first team, it follows 1,159 Christians were killed. The following tables present the details about the places where they were killed.

#### Details – Estimated number of Christians killed and injured in Bali LGA (Taraba Central)<sup>50</sup>

Town/Village	No. of people killed	Religion
Agbadorough	6	Christians
Borno Kuruku	89	Christians
Jatau / other villages	127	Christians
Maihula	43	Christians
Moaveze	10	Christians
Nahuta	61	Christians
Pasoki	7	Christians
Sabon Dare	21	Christians
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>364</b>	

<sup>50</sup> Information obtained from the Tiv Traditional elders of Bali LGA, Taraba State.

**Details – Estimated number of Christians killed and injured in Donga LGA (Southern Taraba)<sup>51</sup>**

Town/Village	No. of people killed	Religion
Ananum	18	Christians
Borogo	1	Christians
Dogo	2	Christians
Sabon-Gida Isha	22	Christians
Shaakaa	7	Christians
Wahanye	11	Christians
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>61</b>	

**Details – Estimated number of Christians killed and injured in Gashaka LGA (Taraba Central)<sup>52</sup>**

Town/Village	No. of people killed	Religion
Ajai	3	Christians
Bashirshir	6	Christians
Gangunmi	21	Christians
Garbabi / other villages	25	Christians
Katee	5	Christians
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>60</b>	

**Details – Estimated number of Christians killed and injured in Gassol LGA (Taraba Central)<sup>53</sup>**

Town/Village	No. of people killed	Religion
Chediya	26	Christians
Dan-Anacha	79	Christians
Dinya Village	51	Christians
Sabon-Gida Takai	67	Christians
Yerima	17	Christians
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>240</b>	

**Details – Estimated number of Christians killed and injured in Ibi LGA (Southern Taraba)<sup>54</sup>**

Town/Village	No. of people killed	Religion
Dampar	30	Christians
Dooshima	20	Christians
Gazor	10	Christians
Ibua	15	Christians
Kaamem	10	Christians
Moti	15	Christians
Sarkin Kudu	30	Christians
Zogon-Kaya	10	Christians
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>140</b>	

<sup>51</sup> Information obtained from the Youth Wing, Donga LGA, Taraba State.

<sup>52</sup> Information obtained from the Tiv Cultural and Social Association, Jalingo, Taraba State.

<sup>53</sup> Information obtained from the Youth Group of Gassol LGA, Taraba State, who documented the number of people killed.

<sup>54</sup> Information obtained from the Tiv Cultural and Social Association, Ibi LGA, Taraba State.

**Details – Estimated number of Christians killed and injured in Takum LGA (Southern Taraba) <sup>55</sup>**

Town/Village	No. of people killed	Religion
Abeda	7	Christians
Adu	9	Christians
Atogbenda	5	Christians
Camp Gbenger	7	Christians
Dogon Gawa	31	Christians
Mbayevikyaior	11	Christians
New Gboko	3	Christians
Tortsee	21	Christians
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>94</b>	

**Details – Estimated number of Christians killed and injured in Wukari LGA (Southern Taraba) <sup>56</sup>**

Town/Village	No. of people killed	Religion
Akwana	27	Christians
Arufu	13	Christians
Bantaje	25	Christians
Chinkai	23	Christians
Chonku	20	Christians
Gborucha	20	Christians
Jibu	30	Christians
Kente	42	Christians
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>200</b>	

**Remarks:** The first set of data presented here shows that the total number of Christians killed in northern and central Taraba between December 2013 and July 2015 was 1,159. Some local observers maintain that the number could be much higher than what is presented above. This is likely to be true because during the data-collection process thousands of people, including community leaders, had been displaced and some of the villages and local communities were without people to provide more evidence to the team regarding what they had seen or witnessed. Again, the categories considered here were limited simply to the number of Christians killed. Christians here represented adults excluding children. Additionally, those who remained behind in some of the villages and communities were unwilling to talk or disclose what they had witnessed to the NCSAN team. Most importantly, some of the towns and villages were inaccessible due to security reasons, bad road networks and transportation difficulties. To verify these numbers and to ascertain whether the figures of people killed is really higher than what is presented above, NCSAN's second team widened its scope of investigation.

This team, led by a member of NCSAN, considered the same period from December 2013 to July 2015. This time, the category of the victims was further specified to include those killed and injured, as well as adults and children. The scope of the investigation and data collection considered seven

<sup>55</sup> Information obtained from the Concerned Taraba Tiv Youth Frontier, Takum LGA, Taraba State.

<sup>56</sup> Information obtained from a former official of the Taraba State government, Jalingo, Taraba State.

LGAs, all in central and southern Taraba State: Wukari, Gassol, Ibi, Donga, Bali, Takum and Gashaka LGAs. These LGAs were chosen because they are among the worst affected areas. Secondly, the team had greater local contact and people and could easily reach people who were readily available to assist with the data collection. Despite the security risks, the team was able to obtain the data presented here. In addition, documents were obtained from the Catholic Secretariat of Jalingo Diocese, TEKAN block of CAN, Taraba State and the Youth Wing, Taraba State Chapter of Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN). Other sources included an open letter written by Taraba Concerned Tiv Youth Frontier to President Goodluck Jonathan, a memo by the Tiv Leadership Council and a detailed “Report on the Fulani Herdsmen Attacks in Taraba State” by the Tiv Central leader. In addition there were written testimonies by individuals, youth organizations from various LGAs and civil society groups that documented the killings. It is important to note that the team interviewed the chairman of the Taraba State Muslim Council and also visited the headquarters of the council in Jalingo to obtain documents related to the killing of Muslims and the destruction of mosques (if any) in the state. However, the council was unwilling to share any data with the team. Below are tables showing the number of Christians (both adults and children) killed or injured from the data obtained by NCSAN’s second team.

### **Results second team**

#### **Overview - Estimated Number of Christians killed and injured in seven LGAs (Taraba State)**

S/n	Name of LGA	No. of Christian men killed	No. of Christian women killed	No. of Christian children killed	Total No. of Christians killed	No. of Christian men injured	No. of Christian women injured	No. of Christian children injured	Total No. of Christians injured
1	Bali	83	67	96	<b>246</b>	206	162	94	<b>462</b>
2	Donga	87	74	59	<b>220</b>	136	104	71	<b>311</b>
3	Gashaka	21	26	18	<b>65</b>	55	47	20	<b>122</b>
4	Gassol	88	107	80	<b>275</b>	248	180	141	<b>569</b>
5	Ibi	65	53	57	<b>175</b>	93	86	48	<b>227</b>
6	Takum	49	35	41	<b>125</b>	105	69	45	<b>219</b>
7	Wukari	139	145	94	<b>378</b>	226	169	83	<b>478</b>
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>532</b>	<b>507</b>	<b>445</b>	<b>1484</b>	<b>1069</b>	<b>817</b>	<b>502</b>	<b>2388</b>

From the available statistics presented by the second team, it follows 1,484 Christians were killed out of which 532 were men, 507 women and 445 children. The statistics also show that 2,388 Christians were injured out of which 1,069 were men, 817 women and 502 children. The following tables present the details about the places where they were killed or injured.



**Details - Estimated Number of Christians killed and injured in Bali LGA<sup>57</sup>**

S/n	Name of village/ locality	No. of Christian men killed	No. of Christian women killed	No. of Christian children killed	<b>Total No. of Christians killed</b>	No. of Christian men injured	No. of Christian women injured	No. of Christian children injured	<b>Total No. of Christians injured</b>
1	Abuja-Bali	2	1	2	<b>5</b>	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
2	Adamshiva	1	2	0	<b>3</b>	1	1	0	<b>2</b>
3	Adi-Kyase	1	1	2	<b>4</b>	0	3	0	<b>3</b>
4	Agbadorugh	2	0	2	<b>4</b>	6	0	3	<b>9</b>
5	Agea-Iyo	2	0	1	<b>3</b>	6	0	0	<b>6</b>
6	Agia	0	0	1	<b>1</b>	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
7	Agulugu	0	3	0	<b>3</b>	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
8	Akange	1	1	0	<b>2</b>	1	1	4	<b>6</b>
9	Aker Ijor	3	1	0	<b>4</b>	0	6	1	<b>7</b>
10	Angbianshio	0	3	1	<b>4</b>	1	0	0	<b>1</b>
11	Anjov	2	0	0	<b>2</b>	8	1	1	<b>10</b>
12	Aondonengen	0	2	4	<b>6</b>	2	3	4	<b>9</b>
13	Aondo-Tyobo	0	2	0	<b>2</b>	0	0	4	<b>4</b>
14	Apeaule	1	0	2	<b>3</b>	0	7	1	<b>8</b>
15	Apeife	1	0	1	<b>2</b>	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
16	Apezan	0	0	4	<b>4</b>	0	0	3	<b>3</b>
17	Ayough	0	0	1	<b>1</b>	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
18	Bandabo	1	0	3	<b>4</b>	3	7	0	<b>10</b>
19	Borno-Kurukuru	1	0	0	<b>1</b>	3	2	0	<b>5</b>
20	Chiahemen	0	3	0	<b>3</b>	11	0	2	<b>13</b>
21	Dooga	1	0	7	<b>8</b>	2	0	0	<b>2</b>
22	Dooshima	0	2	1	<b>3</b>	8	2	1	<b>11</b>
23	Elias Abum	0	0	0	<b>0</b>	8	3	2	<b>13</b>
24	Emberga	0	0	1	<b>1</b>	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
25	Gazabu	1	3	2	<b>6</b>	0	0	2	<b>2</b>
26	Gbaagire	1	1	0	<b>2</b>	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
27	Gian-Lua	1	2	0	<b>3</b>	0	2	0	<b>2</b>
28	Igba-Uja	0	0	0	<b>0</b>	5	1	0	<b>6</b>
29	Igba-Umaru	1	0	0	<b>1</b>	3	5	0	<b>8</b>
30	Iliambee	5	0	1	<b>6</b>	0	0	5	<b>5</b>
31	Inyam Uburga	0	1	0	<b>1</b>	4	5	3	<b>12</b>
32	Iorbee	0	0	1	<b>1</b>	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
33	Iortambe	1	2	0	<b>3</b>	0	2	0	<b>2</b>
34	Ityohom	3	0	0	<b>3</b>	1	8	0	<b>9</b>
35	Jatau	2	1	1	<b>4</b>	5	5	0	<b>10</b>
36	Jibili	1	1	0	<b>2</b>	2	0	0	<b>2</b>
37	Kadoloko	0	2	0	<b>2</b>	0	0	5	<b>5</b>
38	Karshima	1	2	3	<b>6</b>	2	0	0	<b>2</b>
39	Kegh	0	0	2	<b>2</b>	0	7	0	<b>7</b>
40	Korun	2	0	2	<b>4</b>	1	2	1	<b>4</b>
41	Kuma Jov	1	2	1	<b>4</b>	6	2	1	<b>9</b>
42	Kungana	4	3	2	<b>9</b>	12	2	0	<b>14</b>
43	Kwaghbo	1	1	0	<b>2</b>	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
44	Loko-Goma	3	1	0	<b>4</b>	0	2	1	<b>3</b>

<sup>57</sup> The authors collected this data from local Christian leaders of the following denominations: United Methodist Church of Nigeria (UMCN), Roman Catholic Church, Nongu Kristu U Ser ken Tar (NKST), Deeper Life Bible Church, and Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA).

45	Maihula	1	0	2	3	2	4	0	6
46	Moaveze	3	2	0	5	6	1	5	12
47	Msugh	2	0	0	2	2	5	2	9
48	Mtunaga	1	4	1	6	0	0	0	0
49	Mura	2	2	1	5	0	3	0	3
50	Nahuta	1	0	0	1	2	0	1	3
51	Ngutsav	0	0	0	0	2	2	3	7
52	Nyoruke	1	0	0	1	1	12	3	16
53	Ogoja	1	1	0	2	0	3	0	3
54	Orkuma	0	0	4	4	0	0	0	0
55	Ortseer	4	1	3	8	1	1	3	5
56	Pasoki	2	1	0	3	0	4	0	4
57	Peter	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
58	Peter Sarki	0	0	1	1	9	0	0	9
59	Saawua	1	0	3	4	0	0	6	6
60	Shievihi	1	0	1	2	11	0	0	11
61	Sombu-Twuer	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
62	Tavershima	0	0	1	1	5	4	0	9
63	Terhile	0	0	3	3	7	4	0	11
64	Terlumun	1	0	0	1	9	3	0	12
65	Terwase	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	2
66	Terzugwe	2	1	0	3	7	5	2	14
67	Terzungwe	3	1	6	10	2	0	0	2
68	Tor-Agbakor	0	0	1	1	7	1	4	12
69	Tor-Baki	0	0	0	0	7	1	2	10
70	Torbee	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	4
71	Tsavbee	0	1	3	4	0	5	0	5
72	Tse-Mkar	0	0	8	8	7	3	4	14
73	Tyokaa	1	0	0	1	9	4	0	13
74	Tyokyar	1	3	0	4	0	0	1	1
75	Tyosaa	1	0	0	1	3	0	0	3
76	Utange	0	1	2	3	0	7	0	7
77	Uter	1	1	3	5	1	1	0	2
78	Utim	2	1	1	4	1	3	1	5
79	Utsua	2	0	0	2	0	3	5	8
80	Vihishima	0	4	0	4	0	0	2	2
81	Yiman	0	0	2	2	0	0	3	3
82	Yinamga	1	0	0	1	0	3	1	4
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>246</b>	<b>206</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>462</b>

**Details - Estimated Number of Christians killed and injured in Donga LGA<sup>58</sup>**

S/n	Name of village/ locality	No. of Christian men killed	No. of Christian women killed	No. of Christian children killed	Total No. of Christians killed	No. of Christian men injured	No. of Christian women injured	No. of Christian children injured	Total No. of Christians injured
1	Agandi	6	0	3	9	5	3	0	8
2	Aker	2	2	1	5	1	3	2	6
3	Akiigh	5	3	0	8	5	0	1	6
4	Ananum	2	0	2	4	3	1	0	4
5	Andwem	1	0	4	5	0	5	3	8
6	Ankugh	1	2	2	5	3	3	3	9
7	Aondotsea	3	1	2	6	1	1	0	2
8	Atogbenda	3	2	1	6	7	2	0	9
9	Atsamev	6	0	1	7	9	5	3	17
10	Awua	1	3	2	6	1	4	1	6
11	Ayo	2	2	1	5	6	1	2	9
12	Borkono	4	1	2	7	9	2	2	13
13	Borogo	0	2	0	2	0	2	1	3
14	Bushi	1	4	2	7	4	2	3	9
15	Buter	4	0	0	4	7	1	3	11
16	Dima	0	7	1	8	4	6	3	13
17	Emberga	4	2	5	11	7	3	4	14
18	Feda	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	3
19	Igo	3	1	1	5	3	0	0	3
20	Ihue	2	6	4	12	0	3	2	5
21	Injo	0	2	0	2	5	1	0	6
22	Iornzuul	1	1	1	3	1	1	5	7
23	Iperen	1	7	0	8	0	3	4	7
24	Isha-Gogo	3	4	2	9	0	2	2	4
25	Kwaghjua	4	1	3	8	2	2	3	7
26	Mfaga	0	3	0	3	4	7	3	14
27	Mhambe	2	3	1	6	4	3	1	8
28	Mkperai	1	0	3	4	0	1	3	4
29	Moji	1	0	2	3	1	0	0	1
30	Orjiir	4	1	3	8	2	2	2	6
31	Shaakaa	2	0	0	2	5	0	0	5
32	Timber	3	4	1	8	6	4	4	14
33	Toko	1	5	3	9	0	0	0	0
34	Toranako	3	0	0	3	0	0	2	2
35	Tordei	3	2	1	6	2	3	1	6
36	Tyonem	1	3	0	4	0	5	1	6
37	Tyozua	2	0	1	3	6	3	0	9
38	Udende	0	0	0	0	6	7	2	15
39	Unum	3	0	0	3	2	1	2	5
40	Utumba	0	0	3	3	5	7	1	13
41	Uver	1	0	0	1	3	2	2	7
42	Wahanya	1	0	1	2	4	3	0	7
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>220</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>311</b>

<sup>58</sup> The authors collected this data from local Christian leaders of the following denominations: Reformed Church of Christ for Nations (RCCN), Roman Catholic Church, Nongu Kristu U Ser Ken Tar (NKST), and Methodist Church.

### Details - Estimated Number of Christian killed and injured in Gashaka LGA<sup>59</sup>

S/n	Name of village/ locality	No. of Christian men killed	No. of Christian women killed	No. of Christian children killed	Total No. of Christians killed	No. of Christian men injured	No. of Christian women injured	No. of Christian children injured	Total No. of Christians injured
1	Ajayi	1	1	0	2	0	2	0	2
2	Amokaha	0	4	0	4	0	4	6	10
3	Angwan Aboro	1	1	0	2	0	4	0	4
4	Angwan Akor	1	0	0	1	0	2	0	2
5	Angwan Alumo	0	0	1	1	7	2	0	9
6	Angwan Idyar	0	2	1	3	3	1	0	4
7	Angwan Ioryem	1	3	0	4	6	0	2	8
8	Angwan Tor-Tiv	1	1	1	3	8	1	0	9
9	Angwan Vande	0	3	1	4	2	6	1	9
10	Basheshe	1	1	3	5	4	2	1	7
11	Gangumi	2	1	0	3	0	5	0	5
12	Garbabi	3	4	0	7	0	0	3	3
13	Gayam-Center	1	5	0	6	1	3	1	5
14	Iorhinja	0	0	6	6	7	3	2	12
15	Kaberi-Barure	2	0	1	3	4	7	1	12
16	Tulan	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
17	Wonogh Kaki	6	0	0	6	9	1	0	10
18	Woukulu	0	0	4	4	3	2	0	5
19	Woukyaa	1	0	0	1	0	2	3	5
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>122</b>

### Details - Estimated Number of Christians Killed and Injured in Gassol LGA<sup>60</sup>

S/n	Name of village/ locality	No. of Christian men killed	No. of Christian women killed	No. of Christian children killed	Total No. of Christians killed	No. of Christian men injured	No. of Christian women injured	No. of Christian children injured	Total No. of Christians injured
1	Achiaga	3	0	1	4	9	2	0	11
2	Adera	1	0	0	1	0	0	5	5
3	Agbange	1	1	0	2	4	4	2	10
4	Aho	1	3	0	4	0	3	1	4
5	Akoodo	2	1	0	3	6	0	2	8
6	Akume	1	0	0	1	0	6	0	6
7	Anlia	2	0	1	3	0	0	2	2
8	Anongu	1	2	2	5	0	0	2	2
9	Asemapever	2	4	1	7	7	2	0	9
10	Asen	0	2	0	2	6	1	0	7
11	Ashitsongo	2	4	0	6	2	6	0	8
12	Ataikyo	0	2	0	2	1	3	5	9
13	Atange	0	2	0	2	0	0	3	3
14	Atim	1	3	1	5	0	7	1	8
15	Atsua	0	1	1	2	7	2	4	13
16	Ayo	2	2	1	5	2	7	3	12

<sup>59</sup> The authors collected this data from local Christian leaders of the following denominations: Roman Catholic Church, Nongu Kristu U Ser Ken Tar (NKST), and Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA).

<sup>60</sup> The authors collected this data from local Christian leaders of the following denominations: Roman Catholic Church, Nongu Kristu U Ser Ken Tar (NKST), Living Faith Church, Anglican Church, African Church, and Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA).

17	Ayu	1	4	0	5	0	2	0	2
18	Babajuli	2	1	0	3	7	2	3	12
19	Bee	1	0	1	2	1	8	4	13
20	Chia	1	0	0	1	0	6	4	10
21	Chiaerkwagh	2	1	1	4	3	7	2	12
22	Chiasado	1	1	2	4	5	1	4	10
23	Cholough	1	1	0	2	0	2	2	4
24	Daniel	0	0	1	1	2	5	0	7
25	Dooga	0	6	2	8	2	6	0	8
26	Dzwabee	0	1	0	1	3	3	1	7
27	Gaadi	0	2	0	2	3	0	1	4
28	Iba	2	0	2	4	0	2	2	4
29	Icheen	3	0	1	4	1	1	4	6
30	Igba	3	2	3	8	0	4	2	6
31	Ikpur	1	1	1	3	4	3	3	10
32	Iorhumba	0	1	1	2	5	3	0	8
33	Iorhuna	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
34	Ioryina	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
35	Ivo	2	1	4	7	6	3	1	10
36	Ivue	2	2	3	7	5	2	0	7
37	Iwue	0	3	2	5	1	3	0	4
38	Jabong	0	2	1	3	6	0	0	6
39	Jirgba	2	1	2	5	2	1	0	3
40	Jorkyaa	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1
41	Kaduna	0	0	1	1	2	3	1	6
42	Kiffi	1	1	1	3	0	3	1	4
43	Kuleve	0	0	0	0	3	4	2	9
44	Kumekor	1	1	0	2	0	2	1	3
45	Kwaghgeman	1	3	0	4	7	4	0	11
46	Kwaghvihi	2	1	5	8	9	0	0	9
47	Kwaza	4	2	3	9	8	2	0	10
48	Legba	0	0	3	3	1	6	0	7
49	Mali	2	2	1	5	1	2	3	6
50	Mernyi	2	3	0	5	4	0	0	4
51	Mkarga	1	1	1	3	4	1	1	6
52	Mnyamchiegh	1	3	0	4	2	0	1	3
53	Momsange	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	4
54	Mough	0	2	1	3	0	2	0	2
55	Najime	1	0	1	2	3	2	3	8
56	Nongo	1	0	3	4	4	5	4	13
57	Nongusho	0	2	2	4	11	1	4	16
58	Nyichia	2	0	1	3	4	2	2	8
59	Nyikwagh	0	0	2	2	4	1	3	8
60	Orshio	1	3	2	6	0	2	0	2
61	Orsuur	1	2	2	5	2	7	3	12
62	Saawuan	1	2	2	5	0	1	3	4
63	Shibi	2	1	1	4	7	0	4	11
64	Shiki	1	2	0	3	4	4	1	9
65	Targbanger	2	1	0	3	0	0	5	5
66	Temashaku	2	1	0	3	0	0	3	3
67	Torgbur	0	1	0	1	0	2	3	5
68	Tsehembe	1	1	2	4	5	4	4	13

69	Tsekohol	1	3	1	5	9	3	1	13
70	Tsenor	3	3	0	6	2	0	1	3
71	Tyotyter	0	3	0	3	6	1	2	9
72	Tyougese	0	2	0	2	3	0	5	8
73	Ukor	1	0	0	1	2	2	2	6
74	Ukusa	0	0	1	1	7	0	0	7
75	Ukusu	1	0	3	4	3	0	0	3
76	Uma	2	0	1	3	0	0	2	2
77	Usar	0	1	0	1	2	4	0	6
78	Utime	3	0	0	3	6	0	3	9
79	Utsue	1	0	3	4	7	1	0	8
80	Uwua	0	0	0	0	12	0	2	14
81	Var	2	1	2	5	0	1	7	8
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>275</b>	<b>248</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>569</b>

#### Details - Estimated Number of Christians killed and injured in Ibi LGA<sup>61</sup>

S/n	Name of village/ locality	No. of Christian men killed	No. of Christian women killed	No. of Christian children killed	Total No. of Christians killed	No. of Christian men injured	No. of Christian women injured	No. of Christian children injured	Total No. of Christians injured
1	Adom	1	2	1	4	5	2	4	11
2	Angwan Jarawa	0	1	2	3	2	9	1	12
3	Aondohumba	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	3
4	Bosso	0	2	0	2	1	2	1	4
5	Dampar	2	2	1	5	3	4	3	10
6	Dooshima	2	4	1	7	2	4	0	6
7	Gangkpade	4	5	1	10	5	2	0	7
8	Gazor	3	2	5	10	2	5	1	8
9	Gbogodo	1	0	6	7	6	1	2	9
10	Gbor-ucha	3	0	0	3	4	6	1	11
11	Ibi	13	6	8	27	10	9	7	26
12	Ibua	2	3	1	6	3	2	0	5
13	Igbila	0	1	3	4	4	2	6	12
14	Igbogudo	4	6	3	13	6	3	1	10
15	Iortim	1	2	4	7	0	6	0	6
16	Kaamem	3	4	3	10	4	1	6	11
17	Kahan	0	1	1	2	0	3	1	4
18	Kavenan	4	1	3	8	3	1	3	7
19	Kurmi	2	1	1	4	2	3	3	8
20	Moti	4	5	2	11	6	9	0	15
21	Nahuta	4	2	0	6	1	6	2	9
22	Nyomja	0	1	2	3	1	0	2	3
23	Sarkin-Kudu	7	2	1	10	12	4	1	17
24	Tembega	3	0	0	3	0	0	2	2
25	Tyodugh	2	0	2	4	2	0	0	2
26	Zagon kaya	0	0	6	6	9	0	0	9
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>175</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>227</b>

<sup>61</sup> The authors collected this data from local Christian leaders of the following denominations: Roman Catholic Church, Christian Reformed Church of Nigeria (CRCN), Nongu Kristu U Ser ken Tar (NKST), Deeper Life Bible Church, Anglican Church, and Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN).



**Details - Estimated Number of Christians killed and injured in Takum LGA <sup>62</sup>**

S/n	Name of village/ locality	No. of Christian men killed	No. of Christian women killed	No. of Christian children killed	Total No. of Christians killed	No. of Christian men injured	No. of Christian women injured	No. of Christian children injured	Total No. of Christians injured
1	Abeda	0	2	0	2	3	0	0	3
2	Agba	0	1	1	2	3	6	1	10
3	Ammiondo	1	0	0	1	7	3	3	13
4	Ankuu	2	1	0	3	0	4	0	4
5	Atogbenda	2	1	1	4	4	2	1	7
6	Ayaka	1	1	2	4	8	4	2	14
7	Chir-Akera	3	2	0	5	2	3	2	7
8	Dang	5	3	2	10	8	3	0	11
9	Dogon-Gawa	2	2	0	4	1	7	3	11
10	Gaawa-Yoona	0	0	3	3	9	0	1	10
11	Gbaaondo	3	0	2	5	5	2	6	13
12	Gbenger	1	3	0	4	3	3	1	7
13	Gboko-Kpa'ake	1	4	2	7	2	0	0	2
14	Huraiuu	3	0	3	6	4	0	0	4
15	Ikpete	3	0	0	3	3	1	0	4
16	Imbufu	0	4	0	4	6	2	3	11
17	Ityungu	0	0	1	1	0	6	0	6
18	Jatto-takum	3	3	5	11	6	2	1	9
19	Kaamem	2	1	2	5	6	0	3	9
20	Mbayeikyaior	2	0	2	4	1	5	2	8
21	Sati-Asemahaa	3	2	1	6	4	3	0	7
22	Shide	2	1	2	5	5	3	3	11
23	Tomatar-Ikpanjo	0	2	0	2	6	2	2	10
24	Tor-Lijam	4	0	3	7	0	2	5	7
25	Tor-Tser	0	0	4	4	0	3	0	3
26	Tyokaa-Ukuu	0	0	3	3	0	1	0	1
27	Ubonav	3	1	0	4	7	2	6	15
28	Unom	3	1	2	6	2	0	0	2
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>219</b>

**Details - Estimated Number of Christians killed and injured in Wukari LGA <sup>63</sup>**

S/n	Name of village/ locality	No. of Christian men killed	No. of Christian women killed	No. of Christian children killed	Total No. of Christians killed	No. of Christian men injured	No. of Christian women injured	No. of Christian children injured	Total No. of Christians injured
1	Abagye	6	0	0	6	0	0	0	0
2	Abako	3	5	0	8	11	2	1	14
3	Abinki	0	7	0	7	2	0	3	5
4	Achambe	7	2	0	9	1	0	3	4
5	Achide	3	1	8	12	13	0	0	13
6	Adio	0	4	0	4	0	0	0	0

<sup>62</sup> The authors collected this data from local Christian leaders of the following denominations: Roman Catholic Church, Nongu Kristu U Ser Ken Tar (NKST), Reformed Church of Christ for the Nations (RCCN), Deeper Life Bible Church, and Methodist Church.

<sup>63</sup> The authors collected this data from local Christian leaders of the following denominations: Roman Catholic Church, Christian Reformed Church of Nigeria (CRCN), Nongu Kristu U Ser Ken Tar (NKST), Deeper Life Bible Church, and Anglican Church.

7	Agan	3	0	0	<b>3</b>	5	9	0	<b>14</b>
8	Ager	0	2	1	<b>3</b>	0	0	4	<b>4</b>
9	Akawe	2	0	0	<b>2</b>	3	6	1	<b>10</b>
10	Akwana	2	2	0	<b>4</b>	6	0	0	<b>6</b>
11	Amokaha	0	0	1	<b>1</b>	4	1	3	<b>8</b>
12	Anyam	2	1	0	<b>3</b>	0	4	3	<b>7</b>
13	Apa	1	8	4	<b>13</b>	6	1	0	<b>7</b>
14	Arufu	1	0	0	<b>1</b>	2	9	1	<b>12</b>
15	Asongu	3	6	2	<b>11</b>	5	2	0	<b>7</b>
16	Atoro	0	5	1	<b>6</b>	8	1	0	<b>9</b>
17	Avyioko	2	1	0	<b>3</b>	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
18	Awambe-Wuma	1	6	2	<b>9</b>	2	4	0	<b>6</b>
19	Chihe	1	0	0	<b>1</b>	5	0	0	<b>5</b>
20	Chinkai	1	3	2	<b>6</b>	4	3	2	<b>9</b>
21	Chonku	4	1	4	<b>9</b>	0	6	0	<b>6</b>
22	Demelu	3	2	0	<b>5</b>	3	2	1	<b>6</b>
23	Dooshima	1	3	0	<b>4</b>	2	9	0	<b>11</b>
24	Dzendesha	1	2	0	<b>3</b>	6	1	4	<b>11</b>
25	Faga	2	2	5	<b>9</b>	6	0	4	<b>10</b>
26	Gbawuan	4	1	0	<b>5</b>	0	2	2	<b>4</b>
27	Gborbegha	2	1	5	<b>8</b>	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
28	Ibo	2	0	6	<b>8</b>	2	3	3	<b>8</b>
29	Ieren	3	0	0	<b>3</b>	0	1	2	<b>3</b>
30	Igbayima	1	1	2	<b>4</b>	2	1	1	<b>4</b>
31	Ikperen	2	0	2	<b>4</b>	8	2	0	<b>10</b>
32	Ikyo	1	0	3	<b>4</b>	9	2	0	<b>11</b>
33	Iorhuna	0	2	0	<b>2</b>	4	0	0	<b>4</b>
34	Iorja	4	2	0	<b>6</b>	1	3	2	<b>6</b>
35	Jibu	3	7	2	<b>12</b>	21	8	3	<b>32</b>
36	Jingir	4	6	2	<b>12</b>	12	3	6	<b>21</b>
37	Kerensho	3	0	3	<b>6</b>	0	0	2	<b>2</b>
38	Kpurkpur	4	3	0	<b>7</b>	1	0	0	<b>1</b>
39	Kwaor	3	1	2	<b>6</b>	2	5	0	<b>7</b>
40	Kyaior	3	4	1	<b>8</b>	2	0	7	<b>9</b>
41	Mbaju	0	6	0	<b>6</b>	1	0	0	<b>1</b>
42	Nege	2	1	0	<b>3</b>	0	4	2	<b>6</b>
43	Nwonko	5	3	6	<b>14</b>	12	3	2	<b>17</b>
44	Nyamhina	3	4	1	<b>8</b>	9	6	4	<b>19</b>
45	Nyikyaa	1	0	0	<b>1</b>	5	0	0	<b>5</b>
46	Shausu	4	3	1	<b>8</b>	0	3	0	<b>3</b>
47	Shiva	2	2	2	<b>6</b>	4	5	0	<b>9</b>
48	Sondi	3	2	1	<b>6</b>	6	2	1	<b>9</b>
49	Sontyo	1	2	0	<b>3</b>	0	2	0	<b>2</b>
50	Sukpe	6	2	1	<b>9</b>	4	1	0	<b>5</b>
51	Suwe	1	0	0	<b>1</b>	0	2	0	<b>2</b>
52	Torkwanta	2	1	0	<b>3</b>	7	1	0	<b>8</b>
53	Tor-Musa	1	2	0	<b>3</b>	0	3	0	<b>3</b>
54	Tsavtera	0	7	2	<b>9</b>	0	4	1	<b>5</b>
55	Tse-Vember	4	1	0	<b>5</b>	1	3	2	<b>6</b>
56	Tse-Amenger	1	3	3	<b>7</b>	3	4	1	<b>8</b>
57	Tse-tar	2	3	6	<b>11</b>	2	0	0	<b>2</b>
58	Udemar	0	3	0	<b>3</b>	0	5	0	<b>5</b>

59	Ugber	0	0	4	<b>4</b>	1	6	2	<b>9</b>
60	Vaayem	1	5	2	<b>8</b>	4	7	1	<b>12</b>
61	Wukari	11	4	7	<b>22</b>	9	12	9	<b>30</b>
62	Zapine	1	0	0	<b>1</b>	0	6	0	<b>6</b>
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>139</b>	<b>145</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>378</b>	<b>226</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>478</b>

**Remarks:** Wukari LGA, where the conflict started in 2013, had a death toll of 378 Christians. The greatest number of those killed after Wukari LGA are to be found in Gassol LGA with a total number of 275 Christians killed and in Bali LGA with 246 Christians killed. Figures show that more women and men died in Wukari and Gassol LGAs than in any of the other under review. In addition to other factors explained later, one of the reasons Wukari and Gassol LGAs have such a high number of those killed is because the Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen are likely to have the greatest opposition coming from those areas. Secondly, they have been areas of contestation for Muslim domination and control. It is also important to point out that more children were killed in Bali and Wukari LGAs than in any other LGA. This is in total betrayal of cultural norms that allow for the protection of children and the vulnerable, even in times of war. While it is difficult to explain this unfortunate development, there is the likelihood that children were targeted as a deliberate means of truncating the future population of Christians in Taraba State. Truncating the future population of Christians has manifold advantages that include less competition in economic and political life of the state along inter-religious lines.



*Christian indigenous farmers who were attacked by Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen receiving treatment at a local clinic - Source: NCSAN*

The reasons for the differences in figures presented by the first and second groups are not hard to see. First, differences could occur due to the methodology used in obtaining the information. In the first set of data, the category of Christians killed was limited to adults, while in the second set of data the category of Christians killed included both adults and children. Furthermore, the first set of data covered information obtained from an average of 6-7 villages in all seven LGAs in central and southern Taraba State, while the second set of data included an average of 10-12 villages from which information was obtained. Additionally, the first set of data relied on interviews and testimonies from individuals, community leaders and witnesses in these towns and villages, while the second set of data obtained further evidence from official documents of Church organizations, civil society groups, Youth organizations and movements. Christians who escaped the killings in central and

southern Taraba found themselves in IDP camps including towns along the Taraba-Benue state border and the Nigeria-Cameroon border in southern Adamawa State. It is important to note that the inability of the team to reach every corner where violent conflict has taken place in Taraba is reflected in the low figures of the numbers killed. Further factors causing the low figures were the difficult security situation and the refusal of some of the respondents to reveal the atrocities committed. More research is required to unearth the full extent of atrocities being committed by the Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen in Taraba State.

**IDPs and IDP Camps**

**TAD – Category 2: The number of IDPs and IDP Camps.** The second category of the Taraba Atrocities Data is linked to the number of IDP camps, and how many IDPs, both Christians and Muslims are in these camps. The large number of IDP Christians in these camps is very significant in the effort to explain the atrocities of Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen against indigenous Christian farmers in Taraba State. The two NCSAN teams visited the northern, central and southern senatorial districts of Taraba State, including the border regions to ascertain the number of IDP camps as well as the number of Christians and Muslims displaced in these camps. Findings of field research conducted indicated the existence of 16 IDP camps, provided for by church organizations, cultural associations and civil society groups, in Taraba and Benue states. Other IDPs have settled along the border areas between Taraba-southern Adamawa and northern Cameroon. The number of IDP camps (including the number of IDPs) presented below reflect the findings at the time the research was carried out.

**Taraba State IDP camps and the number of IDPs**

LGA	Place	Name of camp	Population	Religion
Bali	Bali Town	Total number for four camps:	2,400	Christians
		NKST Church Camp		
		St. Paul’s Catholic Church Camp		
		Legislative Quarters Church Camp		
		Tiv Traditional Hall Camp		
Jalingo	Jalingo Town	NKST Jalingo Camp	1,373	Christians
Ibi	Ibi Town	Ibi Camp	690	Christians
Takum	Peva	Peva Camp	2,889	Christians
	Jato	NKST Jato Camp	1,850	Christians
Mutum Biyu	Wukari-Jalingo Way	Mutum Biyu Camp	2,132	Christians and Muslims
	NKST Church	NKST Church Mutum Biyu Camp	564	Christians
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>11,898</b>	



*Some of the displaced people at Bali - Source: NCSAN*

**Remarks on Taraba State IDP camps:** In Taraba State, there are 10 existing IDP camps with an estimated 11,898 IDPs. Four of these camps are found in Bali LGA (central Taraba) with an estimated 2,400 IDPs, all Christians. Then there are two camps in Mutum Biyu (central Taraba) with 2,696 IDPs, both Christians and Muslims. The inclusion of Muslims in the Mutum Biyu IDP camp is not surprising because as the conflict raged, there were fears of reprisal attacks by Christian groups against Muslims. Considering the dominant presence of Christians in southern Taraba, Mutum Biyu became a likely destination for Muslim IDPs. This is because towns and villages around Mutum are populated by Muslims, and secondly, Mutum is very close to the capital Jalingo and the deployment of security forces can therefore reach the area to protect Muslims more quickly. Other camps are situated in Jalingo (northern Taraba), Ibi and Takum (both southern Taraba). NCSAN teams found out that a considerable number of the displaced Christians camping in Benue state had been absorbed into different families and communities around the Taraba-Benue border.

**Benue State IDP camps and the number of IDPs**

LGA	Place	Name of camp	Population	Religion
Ukum	Jootar	Jootar Primary School Camp	1,282	Christians
	Zaki-Biam	NKST Church & Primary School camp	5,867	Christians
Guma	Guma town	Guma Town Camp	2,102	Christians
	Agasha town	Agasha Camp	1,149	Christians
Logo	Ugba town	Ugba Camp	1,101	Christians
	Abeda town	Abeda Camp	1,163	Christians
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>12,664</b>	





*Some of the displaced Christians from Taraba in and on their way to Benue - Source: NCSAN*

**Remarks on Benue State IDP camps:** In Benue State, there are 6 IDP camps hosting about 12,664 Christian IDP's from Taraba State. This, according to some observers, is not unconnected with socio-cultural ties that most of the displaced Christians in Taraba State share with the border people of Benue State. Most of those in the Benue IDP camps belong to the Tiv ethnic groups. Their ancestors and forefathers are alleged to have migrated from Benue to Taraba centuries ago. Although most of the IDPs were born in Taraba State, they have kept the socio-cultural ties with their kith and kin in Benue State. Facing the Hausa-Fulani Muslim herders' onslaught, they have found themselves taking refuge with their brothers across the border in Benue State.

#### **Nigeria/Cameroon border settlements (southern Adamawa) and the number of IDPs**

The last settlements and IDP camps visited by the NCSAN team were the Christian IDPs from Taraba State who have now settled in villages and towns around Toungo and Lukti on the Nigeria-Cameroon border. The settlements started as camps and the IDPs later established permanent homes in these areas. These settlements include Lukti, Kiri, Daga, Naaya and Naade, all in Toungo LGA, southern Adamawa State, and the Nigeria-Cameroon border. The number of people in these settlements remains unspecified. However, interviews conducted with leading IDPs suggest that there are more than 10,000 IDPs around the border region. There was no independent source to verify this claim.

Meanwhile, the number of Christians in these camps fluctuates depending on the intensity of the conflict. Another factor that determined the population in the camp was the willingness of the host communities (as well as relations) to absorb the displaced Christians into their homes. While the conflict lasted, there were no designated camps by the Taraba State government for the displaced Christians. There are varying narratives from the victims regarding the inability of the Taraba State government to provide camps for the displaced Christians. For instance, in Wukari, Bali and Dan-Anacha the victims argue that the government's refusal to provide camps was a tactic to conceal from the attention of the world the huge population that had been displaced in the state. Umar Garba, the former acting governor of Taraba State, who was contesting for the governorship position in 2015, paid less attention to the camps for fear that national and international knowledge of these camps could damage his political ambition. Hence, the refusal to establish camps for the displaced Christians. Another school of thought argues that, due to the Boko Haram conflict in the northeast

zone, the security operatives had too much on their hands and there were therefore not enough security personnel to guard camps for the internally displaced Christians.

Whatever the reason, the NCSAN was unable to confirm this. However, what was obvious is that the displaced Christian population has left most of the camps. Many have crossed into Cameroon, others have settled in the villages around Toungo LGA including Lukti, Kiri, Naya and Naade. Unfortunately, many of them are registered and recognized as settlers, not indigenes. This means they can be expelled from the area at any time, and if they require land for farming, such land is leased out to them and the land owner reserves the right to take back his land.

It is also important to mention that this figure of 10,000 IDPs was when the conflict was at its height back in 2013/2014. Now many of the IDPs have returned, crossed into Cameroon or simply settled around Toungo. There is no independent statistical research to verify the distribution across the region.

**Churches and properties destroyed**

**TAD – Category 3: Estimated number of churches and properties destroyed.** The third category of the Taraba Atrocities Data examined data on the number of properties destroyed, if such properties belonged to Christians or Muslims, and in many cases the names of the individuals affected by such destruction. In this category, the NCSAN team collected data in Donga, Takum, Wukari and Ibi LGAs (Southern Taraba), as well as Bali and Gassol LGAs (central Taraba). The term *properties* - as understood in this category - refers to farmlands, farm products, houses, churches, mosques and shops. Other properties also include personal items such as cars, bicycles, motorcycles and other private items kept in the house. In this context, houses or churches could be roofed with zinc (described as *zinc house* or *zinc church*). Or they could be roofed with traditional grasses or bamboo leaves (described as *thatched house* or *thatched church*). With references to the churches destroyed, the church could be a single protestant/evangelical church located in a town or village. However, in terms of Catholic churches, the administrative organization indicates that a Parish Central could have 60-70 local other churches under it, technically referred to as *outstations*. These churches are found in different local communities and villages. Evidence obtained from the Secretariat of the Catholic Diocese of Jalingo indicates that it is such churches that have suffered large-scale destruction as shown in the tables below.

**Overview of items lost or destroyed in different 6 LGAs**

LGA	Churches	Houses	Shops / business	Family compounds	Farmland	Goods and properties
Bali	9					
Donga		14			48 yam fields	4 grinding machines, small cattle and food items
Gassol	101	239				
Ibi	10	24				
Takum	2			15	many fields	many properties
Wukari	49	37	39		much farmland	many goods and properties
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>171</b>	<b>314</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>much</b>	<b>many</b>

The statistics show that 171 churches, 314 houses, 39 shops and businesses of Christians have been destroyed, as well as many fields, goods and other possessions. Added to this is the destruction of 15 complete family compounds with many houses and other properties. The following tables present the details. The sources of information on this TAD – Category 3 are the same sources that provided information for TAD – Categories 1 and 2.

**Bali LGA: Garba Chede**

S/n	Items lost or destroyed	Name of owner
1	St. Ann Kahan: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
2	St. Augustine Kavenan: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
3	St. Catherine Alijam: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
4	St. Clement Adom: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
5	St. James Aondohumba: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
6	St. John Tyodugh: zinc church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
7	St. Mary Nyomja: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
8	St. Michael Tembega: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
9	St. Raphael Igbila: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>9 churches</b>	

**Donga LGA: Isha - properties lost or destroyed**

S/n	Items lost or destroyed	Name of owner
1	1 grinding machine	Aondoazungwe John Bagu
2	5 zinc Houses	Aondona Avindiir
3	1 zinc House	Ayaabi Aerga
4	1 zinc house, 2 grinding machines, 20 pigs, 40 goats, 500 tubers of water yam and 40 bags of corn	Kumaga Iorvihi
5	2 zinc houses	Nongoga yawe
6	1 zinc house and 1 grinding machine	Orya Ayo
7	2 zinc houses	Shiaondo Orlian
8	1 zinc house	Terhile Famyam
9	1 zinc house	Timga Ayange
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>14 houses and other properties</b>	

**Donga LGA: Isha – farmland lost or destroyed**

S/n	Items lost or destroyed	Name of owner
1	2 planted yam fields	Akura Mende
2	6 planted yam fields	Anakumbuur Iorngeam
3	2 planted yam fields	Andrew John
4	1 planted yam field	Aondohemba Yoosu
5	3 planted yam fields	Aondona Avindiir
6	2 planted yam fields	Aondona Tyoga
7	1 planted yam field	Asaamoga John Bagu
8	3 planted yam fields	Famyam Logo
9	1 planted yam field	Iorhom Yawe
10	5 planted yam fields	Kumaga Iorvihi
11	2 planted yam fields	Nongoga Yawe
12	2 planted yam fields	Orfatyo Orlian



13	5 planted yam fields	Orya Ayo
14	2 planted yam fields	Peter Mbaadega
15	2 planted yam fields	Sunday Ordue
16	1 planted yam field	Ter Ukor
17	2 planted yam fields	Tersoo Uzauzakpe
18	1 planted yam field	Terwase Shahia
19	1 planted yam field	Tyerlumun Avindiir
20	3 planted yam fields	Utaver Tuhumba
21	1 planted yam field	Wuabee Shigwa
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>48 planted yam fields</b>	

#### Gassol LGA: St Paul Tella churches

S/n	Items lost or destroyed	Name of owner
1	Agbange: zinc church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
2	Akoodo: zinc church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
3	Anliva: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
4	Anongo: zinc church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
5	Asongo: zinc church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
6	Ataikyo: zinc church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
7	Atsua: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
8	Audu Jabong: zinc church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
9	Ayo: zinc church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
10	Ayue: zinc church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
11	Babajuli: zinc church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
12	Bee: zinc church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
13	Daniel: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
14	Gaadi: zinc church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
15	Ikyo: zinc church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
16	Ivue: zinc church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
17	Kwaghgeman: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
18	Mkarga: zinc church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
19	Orsuur: zinc church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
20	Shiiki: zinc church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
21	Torgbur 1: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
22	Torgbur 2: zinc church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
23	Tsekohol 1: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
24	Tsekohol 2: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
25	Tsenor: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
26	Tyotyer: zinc church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
27	Ukor: zinc church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
28	Zwabee: zinc church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>28 churches</b>	

**Gassol LGA: Sabon Gida (outstations of St. Patrick's Catholic Parish)**

<b>S/n</b>	<b>Items lost or destroyed</b>	<b>Name of owner</b>
1	Abeda Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
2	Achiaga Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
3	Achiyuan Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
4	Adera Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
5	Adyegh Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
6	Aho Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
7	Akor Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
8	Akpenpirigh Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
9	Akume Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
10	Angyer Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
11	Aodaye Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
12	Asemapever Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
13	Asen Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
14	Ashitsongo Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
15	Atange Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
16	Atim Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
17	Ayu Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
18	Chia Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
19	Chiaerkwagh Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
20	Chiasado Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
21	Cholugh Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
22	Dooga Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
23	Iba Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
24	Igba Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
25	Ijever Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
26	Ikpur Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
27	Iorfa Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
28	Iorhumba Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
29	Iorshe Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
30	Ioryina Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
31	Ishiom Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
32	Ivo Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
33	Iware Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
34	Jirgba Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
35	Kaasha Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
36	Kaduna Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
37	Kifi Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
38	Kuleve Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
39	Kumekor Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
40	Kwaghvihi Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
41	Kwar Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
42	Kwaza Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
43	Legba Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
44	Mali Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
45	Mnyamchiel Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
46	Momsange Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
47	Mough Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
48	Najime Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo

49	Nongo Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
50	Nongosho Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
51	Nyichia Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
52	Nyikwagh Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
53	Orhena Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
54	Saawuan Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
55	Shenge Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
56	Shibi Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
57	St. Mary's Icheen Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
58	Sundayough Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
59	Targbanger Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
60	Tsebba Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
61	Tsehemba Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
62	Tyokpough Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
63	Tyokyaa Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
64	Tyotsugh Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
65	Ugase Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
66	Ukusa Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
67	Uma Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
68	Usar Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
69	Utime Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
70	Utsue Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
71	Uwua Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
72	Var Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
73	Waayange Church	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>73 churches</b>	

#### Gassol LGA: Tella

S/no	Items lost or destroyed	Village	Name of owner
1	Zinc house	Akoodo	Akoodo Edward
2	Thatched house	Akoodo	Doccas Versue
3	Thatched house	Akoodo	Esther Denis
4	Thatched house	Akoodo	Godwin Aondohemba
5	Thatched house	Akoodo	Paul Tyozua
6	Thatched house	Akoodo	Philomina Nombua
7	Thatched house	Akoodo	Rachael Sabastine
8	Thatched house	Akoodo	Rosemary Daniel
9	Thatched house	Akoodo	Victoria Joseph
10	Thatched house	Anliva	Benjamin Akubwa
11	Thatched house	Anliva	Caleb Aondohemba
12	Thatched house	Anliva	Elizabeth Tor
13	Thatched house	Anliva	Flowrence Aondohemba
14	Thatched house	Anliva	Magdaline Akubwa
15	Thatched house	Anliva	Peter Sham
16	Thatched house	Anliva	Philemina Aondohemba
17	Thatched house	Anliva	Rebecca Osigh
18	Thatched house	Anongo	Aondoasee Apeseza
19	Thatched house	Anongo	Beauty Akerabe
20	Zinc house	Anongo	Benjamine

21	Thatched house	Anongo	Joy Akerabe
22	Thatched house	Anongo	Mary John
23	Thatched house	Anongo	Orbum Apeseza
24	Thatched house	Anongo	Rebecca Iorbee
25	Thatched house	Anongo	Simon Akerabe
26	Thatched house	Anongo	Tomas Akerabe
27	Thatched house	Asongo	Eunice Utume
28	Zinc house	Asongo	Fidelis Swende
29	Thatched house	Asongo	Gabriel Nweke
30	Thatched house	Asongo	James Azon
31	Thatched house	Asongo	Margreth Akpera
32	Thatched house	Asongo	Moses Tamenor
33	Thatched house	Asongo	Mtswenem I James
34	Thatched house	Asongo	Philomina Michael
35	Thatched house	Ataikyo	Andrew Tsernande
36	Thatched house	Ataikyo	Catherine Daniel
37	Thatched house	Ataikyo	Daniel Tombunlua
38	Thatched house	Ataikyo	David Chia
39	Thatched house	Ataikyo	Dooter Andrew
40	Thatched house	Ataikyo	Moses Yangel
41	Thatched house	Ataikyo	Octyom David
42	Thatched house	Ataikyo	Regina David
43	Thatched house	Ataikyo	Sabrina David
44	Thatched house	Ataikyo	Samuel David
45	Thatched house	Ataikyo	Sauluan David
46	Thatched house	Ataikyo	Sinion Tombula
47	Thatched house	Ataikyo	Solomon David
48	Thatched house	Ataikyo	Sumter Andrew
49	Thatched house	Ataikyo	Terkula Igba
50	Thatched house	Ataikyo	Terver Daniel
51	Thatched house	Ataikyo	Terzungade Andrew
52	Thatched house	Ataikyo	Veronica Terkula
53	Thatched house	Ataikyo	Veronica Yatengel
54	Thatched house	Ataikyo	Williams Tsavnande
55	Thatched house	Atsua	Celina Mtswenem
56	Thatched house	Atsua	Ellizabeth Hede
57	Zinc house	Atsua	Gideon Uhemem
58	Thatched house	Atsua	Michael Tynongu
59	Thatched house	Atsua	Pollina Terkwa
60	Thatched house	Atsua	Veronica Pira
61	Thatched house	Ayo	John Usa
62	Thatched house	Ayo	Jonathan Ter
63	Thatched house	Ayo	Michael Sarki
64	Thatched house	Ayo	Victoria Nongu
65	Thatched house	Ayue	Christiana Joshe
66	Thatched house	Ayue	David Yove
67	Thatched House	Ayue	Helen Sarki
68	Thatched house	Ayue	Mary Dekera
69	Thatched house	Ayue	Rebecca Andphemba
70	Thatched house	Ayue	Roseline Moses

71	Thatched house	Ayue	Tabitha Shimbaye
72	Thatched house	Bee	Alpar Ijubu
73	Thatched house	Bee	Aondoulase Ijubu
74	Thatched house	Bee	Eunice Alpar
75	Thatched house	Bee	Moses Bee
76	Thatched house	Bee	Ngusunun Ijubu
77	Thatched house	Bee	Terdo Ijubu
78	Thatched house	Daniel	Franca Moses
79	Zinc house	Daniel	James Kunde
80	Thatched house	Daniel	Magareth Iorkumbur
81	Thatched house	Daniel	Solomon Nor
82	Thatched house	Gaadi	Augustine Unan
83	Thatched house	Gaadi	Caroline Nembar
84	Thatched house	Gaadi	Cyprian Ali
85	Thatched house	Gaadi	James Usueh
86	Thatched house	Gaadi	Mary Ali
87	Thatched house	Gaadi	Poulina Augustine
88	Thatched house	Gaadi	Salome Unan
89	Thatched house	Ikyo	Catherine Yaorny
90	Thatched house	Ikyo	Eunice Saaondo
91	Thatched house	Ikyo	Fidelis Unongo
92	Thatched house	Ikyo	Hellen Fidelis
93	Thatched house	Ikyo	Hembadoon Saaondo
94	Thatched house	Ikyo	Humbadoon Akumbul
95	Thatched house	Ikyo	Innocent Mchia
96	Thatched house	Ikyo	Iornenge Unongo
97	Thatched house	Ikyo	Mbayannur Innocent
98	Thatched house	Ikyo	Saaonda Mchia
99	Thatched house	Ikyo	Samuel Yaorny
100	Thatched house	Ikyo	Seuluese Saaondo
101	Thatched house	Ikyo	Ternenge Yaorny
102	Thatched house	Ivue	Christina Agbanga
103	Thatched house	Ivue	Francisca Vihimga
104	Thatched house	Ivue	Samuel Ivue
105	Thatched house	Ivue	Theresa Mgbaikaa
106	Thatched house	Kwaghemen	Augustine Alexander
107	Thatched house	Kwaghemen	Elizabeth Jonathan
108	Thatched house	Kwaghemen	Felicia Iorshe
109	Thatched house	Mkarga	David Ungee
110	Thatched house	Mkarga	Tahar Agaba
111	Thatched house	Orsuur	Agatha Moses
112	Zinc house	Orsuur	Aondoaver Samuel
113	Thatched house	Orsuur	Bendo Emmanuel
114	Thatched house	Orsuur	Emmanuel Iorheme
115	Thatched house	Orsuur	Filib Samuel
116	Thatched house	Orsuur	Gabriel Emmanuel
117	Zinc house	Orsuur	Joshua Samuel
118	Thatched house	Orsuur	Magret Ianshima
119	Thatched house	Orsuur	Maluese Iorhemen
120	Thatched house	Orsuur	Moses Ianshima

121	Thatched house	Orsuur	Msonter Emmanuel
122	Zinc house	Orsuur	Orsuur Samuel
123	Thatched house	Orsuur	Rose Iorhemen
124	Thatched house	Orsuur	Sabina John
125	Thatched house	Orsuur	Seembee John
126	Thatched house	Orsuur	Titus Ianshima
127	Thatched house	Shaki	Doom Sugh
128	Thatched house	Shaki	James oryima
129	Thatched house	Shaki	Julius Sugh
130	Thatched house	Shaki	Kumaten Sugh
131	Thatched house	Shaki	Margaret Bokpa
132	Thatched house	Shaki	Victoria Sugh
133	Thatched house	Shiiki	Celila Peter
134	Thatched house	Shiiki	Elizabeth Lanshima
135	Thatched house	Shiiki	John Iorhbee
136	Thatched house	Shiiki	Kertyo Francis
137	Thatched house	Shiiki	Mercy Tsum
138	Thatched house	Shiiki	Mgunegen Vincent
139	Zinc house	Shiiki	Michael Adagu
140	Thatched house	Shiiki	Moses Lanshima
141	Zinc house	Shiiki	Nancy Samuel
142	Thatched house	Shiiki	peter Uver
143	Zinc house	Shiiki	Samuel Iorhemen
144	Thatched house	Shiiki	Simon Iorhbee
145	Thatched house	Shiiki	Sunday Ikem
146	Thatched house	Shiiki	Tabitha Tsum
147	Thatched house	Shiiki	Victoria Ikem
148	Thatched house	Shiiki	Vincent Ikondo
149	Thatched house	Torbough I	Docas Swende
150	Thatched house	Torbough I	Esther Unongu
151	Thatched house	Torbough I	Gideon Uhemem
152	Thatched house	Torbough I	Jacob Hangen
153	Thatched house	Torbough I	Jessy Kureve
154	Thatched house	Torbough I	Mary Umamde
155	Thatched house	Torbough I	Matthew Uhemem
156	Thatched house	Torbough I	Naomi Francis
157	Thatched house	Torbough I	Nyalitsa Uhemem
158	Thatched house	Torbough I	Rosemary Feese
159	Thatched house	Torbough I	Samuel Gbinde
160	Thatched house	Torbough I	Theresa Michael
161	Thatched house	Torbough I	Victoria Ability
162	Thatched house	Torbough I	Wiliam Gideon
163	Zinc house	Tsekohol	Aondouhemba Verninbe
164	Zinc house	Tsekohol	Asema Tsekona
165	Zinc house	Tsekohol	Joseph Tsekona
166	Zinc house	Tsekohol	Kahemba Aganda
167	Zinc house	Tsekohol	Roseline Yaormyi
168	Zinc house	Tsekohol	Samuel Orsuur
169	Zinc house	Tsekohol	Terese Asema
170	Zinc house	Tsekohol	Victoria Ihongo

171	Thatched house	Tsenor	Abel Lunkposu
172	Thatched house	Tsenor	Blessing Mson
173	Thatched house	Tsenor	Doris Shiku
174	Thatched house	Tsenor	Fabian Akwede
175	Thatched house	Tsenor	Faith James
176	Thatched house	Tsenor	Fedelis Msen
177	Thatched house	Tsenor	Francis Shiku
178	Thatched house	Tsenor	Gloria Lunkposu
179	Thatched house	Tsenor	Godwin Tor
180	Thatched house	Tsenor	Judith Lunkposu
181	Thatched house	Tsenor	Mercy James
182	Thatched house	Tsenor	Mercy Tor
183	Thatched house	Tsenor	Moses Tor
184	Thatched house	Tyotyev	Benjamin Tyotyev
185	Zinc house	Tyotyev	Cecelia Soomiyol
186	Zinc house	Tyotyev	Clement Dankro
187	Thatched house	Tyotyev	Doraty Jacob
188	Thatched house	Tyotyev	Elizabeth Clement
189	Zinc house	Tyotyev	Elizabeth Yoryue
190	Zinc house	Tyotyev	Esther Shapera
191	Thatched house	Tyotyev	Felicia Ticha
192	Zinc house	Tyotyev	Geoferey Toba
193	Thatched house	Tyotyev	Hycenth Maseh
194	Thatched house	Tyotyev	John Ornguga
195	Thatched house	Tyotyev	Jude Aondowase
196	Thatched house	Tyotyev	Lydia Iorhuwa
197	Thatched house	Tyotyev	Margaret Dondowase
198	Zinc house	Tyotyev	Mary Seen
199	Zinc house	Tyotyev	Mary Toba
200	Thatched house	Tyotyev	Mathias Iorhuwa
201	Thatched house	Tyotyev	Michael Iorhuwa
202	Zinc house	Tyotyev	Michael Nyianshuma
203	Zinc house	Tyotyev	Roseline Tyotev
204	Thatched house	Ukor	Celina Igbahum
205	Thatched house	Ukor	Dinah Tar
206	Thatched house	Ukor	Esther Iokumbul
207	Thatched house	Ukor	Eunice Terkaa
208	Thatched house	Ukor	Eunice Ukor
209	Thatched house	Ukor	Herve Tsun
210	Thatched house	Ukor	John Terkaa
211	Thatched house	Ukor	Jude Ukor
212	Thatched house	Ukor	Lydia Iokumbul
213	Thatched house	Ukor	Marthin Dooior
214	Thatched house	Ukor	Timothy Ukor
215	Thatched house	Usar	Abraham Bokpa
216	Thatched house	Usar	Agnes Iornenge
217	Thatched house	Usar	Angelina Dooior
218	Zinc house	Usar	Aondonenge
219	Thatched house	Usar	Aondoulase Iornenge
220	Thatched house	Usar	David Uver

221	Thatched house	Usar	Elizabeth Iornenge
222	Thatched house	Usar	Godulin Iornenge
223	Thatched house	Usar	Hellen Iornenge
224	Thatched house	Usar	Ireren Iornenge
225	Thatched house	Usar	Kakuman Iornenge
226	Thatched house	Usar	Lydia Iornenge
227	Thatched house	Usar	Martha Iornenge
228	Thatched house	Usar	Member Tsum
229	Thatched house	Usar	Rahael Bokpa
230	Thatched house	Usar	Tovun Iornenge
231	Thatched house	Zwabee	David Epharim
232	Thatched house	Zwabee	Edward Ayue
233	Thatched house	Zwabee	Elizabeth Akortse
234	Thatched house	Zwabee	Esther Shaaper
235	Thatched house	Zwabee	Fedelis Misa
236	Thatched house	Zwabee	James Atse
237	Thatched house	Zwabee	James Zwabee
238	Thatched house	Zwabee	Justina Sylvester
239	Thatched house	Zwabee	Thaddius Alu
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>239 houses</b>		

#### Ibi LGA: Dampar

S/n	Items lost or destroyed	Name of owner
1	Angwa Jarawa Catholic Church: roof removed & church vandalized	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
2	Dampar Christian Reformed Church Of Nigeria (CRCN) church: burnt	CRCN Dampar
3	Iortim Catholic Church: roof removed & church vandalized	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
4	Kosso A Catholic Church: roof removed & church vandalized	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
5	Kosso B Catholic Church: roof removed & church vandalized	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
6	Kumaga Catholic Church: roof removed & church vandalized	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
7	Kurmi Catholic Church: roof removed & church vandalized	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
8	Nahuta Catholic Church: roof removed & church vandalized	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
9	Father's house: burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
10	Pastor's house: burnt	CRCN Dampar
11	House destroyed	Anthony M. Zaku
12	House destroyed	Baba Samaila
13	House destroyed	Christiana Egbor
14	House destroyed	Daniel Leku
15	House destroyed	Danjuma Tukura
16	House destroyed	David Taroh
17	House destroyed	Emmanuel Bako
18	House destroyed	Eugene Egwu



19	House destroyed	Gambo Mairafi
20	House destroyed	Habila Adamson
21	House destroyed	Innocent Daniel
22	House destroyed	Isa Zaku
23	House destroyed	John Sayawa
24	House destroyed	Joshua Ubandoma
25	House destroyed	Ladan Sarkin Noma
26	House destroyed	Mai Ungwa Amos
27	House destroyed	Mantau Sule
28	House destroyed	Matthew Oshogbo
29	House destroyed	Namu Wase Tofa
30	House destroyed	Noku Zando
31	House destroyed	Pius Obeta
32	House destroyed	Umaru Audu
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>8 churches and 24 houses</b>	

#### Ibi LGA: Ibi

S/n	Items lost or destroyed	Name of owner
1	Assemblies of God Church, Ibi	Ibi town, headquarters of Ibi LGA
2	Church of Christ In Nigeria, Sarkin-Kudu	Ibi LGA
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2 churches</b>	

#### Takum LGA: Tor-Tsee Zone

S/n	Items lost or destroyed	Name of owner
1	Family compound with 3 rooms <sup>1/</sup> , thatched houses, fields, and other properties	Aondohemba Orkaagaa
2	Family compound with 3 rooms, 34 thatched houses, 2 large fields	Avuur Anongo
3	Family compound with 2 rooms, many thatched houses, fields, and other properties	Emmanuel Ashebee
4	Family compound with thatched houses, 4 motor cycles, fields, and other properties	Gwa Taun
5	Family compound with thatched houses, fields, and other properties	Iorpenda Uki
6	Family compound with 3 rooms, some thatched houses, and fields	Iorsalem
7	Family compound with 3 rooms, many thatched houses, 9 fields, and a thatched roof church	Joseph Dakah
8	Family compound with 2 rooms, many thatched houses, fields, and other properties	Joseph Iorhemem
9	Family compound with 6 rooms, thatched houses, fields, and other properties	Joseph Waya
10	Family compound with 4 rooms, many thatched houses, fields, and other properties	Msugh Gaji
11	Family compound with thatched houses, fields, and other properties	Samuel Waya
12	Family compound with thatched houses, fields, and other properties	Terhile Orkaaga

13	Family compound with 2 rooms and many thatched houses	Tyavger Dakah
14	Family compound with thatched houses, fields, and other properties	Uki Buter
15	Family compound with thatched houses, fields, and other properties	Zaki Gajere
16	St. Bridget Catholic Church, Yongogba	Diocese of Jalingo
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2 churches, 15 family compounds with many houses, much farmland, and other properties</b>	

<sup>1/</sup> In the local parlance, a distinction is made between *rooms* (with zinc roofs) and *thatched houses* (those roofed with grass or bamboo leaves).

#### **Wukari LGA: Gindin Dorowa**

<b>S/n</b>	<b>Items lost or destroyed</b>	<b>Name of owner</b>
1	Abagye: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
2	Achide: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
3	Agena: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
4	Ager: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
5	Akembe: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
6	Anyam: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
7	Apa: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
8	Asongu thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
9	Atoro: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
10	Bantaje: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
11	Chia: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
12	Chihe: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
13	Dinya: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
14	Dzendesha: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
15	Faga: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
16	Gbashinbo: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
17	Gbawuan: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
18	Gborbegha: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
19	Huna: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
20	Ieren: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
21	Iornenge: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
22	Jibu: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
23	Jingir: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
24	Kerenisho: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
25	Kpurpur: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
26	Kwaor: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
27	Moshon thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
28	Nege: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
29	Nwonko: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
30	Nyamhina: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
31	Nyikyaa: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
32	Peiyol: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
33	St. Mary Jingir thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
34	St. Oliver Huna: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo

35	St. William Dinya: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
36	Sukpe: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
37	Tine: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
38	Torkwanta: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
39	Tsavtera: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
40	Tyav: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
41	Udemar: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
42	Ugba: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
43	Ugber: thatched church burnt	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>43 churches</b>	

**Wukari LGA: divers**

S/n	Items lost or destroyed	Name of owner
1	Christian Reformed Church Of Nigeria (CRCN), Anam	CRCN
2	CRCN, Akwana	CRCN
3	CRCN, Chinkai	CRCN
4	CRCN, Jibu	CRCN
5	Deeper Life Bible Church, Arufu	Deeper Life Bible Church
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5 churches</b>	

**Wukari LGA: Wukari**

S/n	Items lost or destroyed	Name of owner
1	Shop destroyed	Alex Bonas
2	House destroyed	Angela Oyemaobi
3	House destroyed	Anthonia Ihochi
4	Goods destroyed	Athanasius Elekwachi
5	Farmland destroyed	Barnabas Yade
6	House destroyed	Benedict Idyu
7	Shop destroyed	Bernard Ovile
8	Properties destroyed	Bridget Nwoke
9	House destroyed	Cecilia Charles
10	House destroyed	Charles Okafor
11	Shops and company destroyed	Chief Augustine Alocha
12	Goods destroyed	Chiemeka Madu
13	House and shop destroyed	Chigbo Aaron Ogu
14	Shop destroyed	Chineyere
15	House destroyed	Christian Faga
16	House destroyed	Christopher Ezekwem
17	Farmland destroyed	Christopher Simon
18	Shop destroyed	Cosmas Metu
19	Shop destroyed	Cosmas Oyiema
20	Shop destroyed	Cyril Okonkwo
21	Properties destroyed	Dorcas Mchoho
22	House destroyed	Echioda Aba Friday
23	Properties destroyed	Elizabeth Torwua
24	Shop destroyed	Emmanuel Ekwuzie
25	Shop destroyed	Eric Njoku
26	Shop destroyed	Eric Okoye
27	House destroyed	Esther Edward

28	House destroyed	Esther Sala
29	Shop destroyed	Eugene Ikegwoun
30	Farmland destroyed	Eunice Ioriaha
31	Shop destroyed	Eziaku Emeka
32	Shop destroyed	Ezika Kenechukwu
33	House destroyed	Fidelis Nwachukwu
34	House destroyed	Francis Aligye
35	House destroyed	Francis Maiyange
36	House destroyed	Francis Michael
37	House destroyed	Francisca Mye
38	House destroyed	George Agbo
39	House destroyed	George Oti
40	Goods destroyed	Godwin Victoria
41	Properties destroyed	Grace Iormanger
42	Farmland destroyed	Gwadue Halabiem
43	Properties destroyed	Hanah Shember
44	House and hotel destroyed	Hon. Daniel Utim
45	Goods destroyed	Hyacinth Ezema
46	Properties destroyed	Hycient Nwonu
47	House destroyed	Innocent Uzuanwo
48	Properties destroyed	James Beeve
49	Shop destroyed	James Idam
50	House destroyed	Jonah Abbah
51	Shop destroyed	Jonas Nwoye
52	Goods destroyed	Joseph Agbara
53	House destroyed	Joseph Bako
54	Shop destroyed	Joseph Nnamani
55	House destroyed	Joseph Okorie Ogbodo
56	House destroyed	Joseph Olisa
57	Shop destroyed	Joseph Ubur
58	Properties destroyed	Jude Okpo
59	House destroyed	Justina Simon
60	Shop destroyed	Kajethan Maah
61	Farmland destroyed	Kashin Ugondo
62	Farmland destroyed	Kumaga Craya
63	Shop destroyed	Linus Okafor
64	House destroyed	Margret James
65	Properties destroyed	Mathias Kwaghtan
66	House and shop destroyed	Maxwell Odo
67	House destroyed	Mba Lilian
68	Goods destroyed	Michael Idoko
69	Farmland destroyed	Michael Nyebe
70	Shop destroyed	Michael Ogbonna
71	Farmland destroyed	Mlu Shaminga
72	House destroyed	Ndubisi Idenyi
73	House destroyed	Ngulunga Toelem
74	Shop destroyed	Obinna Asogwa
75	Shop destroyed	Okoye Ugwu
76	Shop destroyed	Onyeama Simon
77	House destroyed	Onyebuchi Nwanu

78	Shop destroyed	Patrick Nwaokoye
79	Shop destroyed	Paul Nwafor
80	House destroyed	Paulina Ioiongon
81	House destroyed	Peter Abama
82	Shop destroyed	Pricillia Okoye
83	Properties destroyed	Rosaline Zever
84	Farmland destroyed	Ruth Chiangi
85	Shop destroyed	Samson Uzoechi
86	House destroyed	Samuel Kwaghule
87	Shop destroyed	Samuel Uto
88	Farmland destroyed	Sarah Idyu
89	Shop destroyed	Sir. Aaron Okeke
90	Shop destroyed	Stephen Edeh
91	Goods destroyed	Sunday Adaonu
92	Shop destroyed	Sunday Okeke
93	Shop destroyed	Sunday Okpara
94	House destroyed	Theophilus Nwankwo
95	Shop destroyed	Theresa Azi
96	Farmland destroyed	Theresa Samuel
97	Farmland destroyed	Thomas
98	House destroyed	Veronica Denis
99	Farmland destroyed	Veronica John
100	House destroyed	Victoria Kugen
101	Shop destroyed	Vyisus
102	Farmland destroyed	Wilfred Orakaa
103	St. Felix's Catholic Church, Ikyaaior	Catholic Diocese of Jalingo
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1 church, 37 houses, 37 shops, 1 company, 1 hotel, much farmland, and many other goods and properties</b>	

### Features of *genocide*

Stating categorically that the violent conflict in Taraba State is *genocide* could be controversial in some quarters. However, from the data presented above it is important to ask whether there is indeed an ongoing *genocide* in Taraba State being committed by the Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen. Without doubt, understanding what constitutes *genocide* is controversial and problematic. What exactly is meant by *genocide*? How does it differ from other forms of collective violence? What are the defining features of particular violence that will qualify it to be *genocide*? According to the legal definition given by the United Nations, “genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”.<sup>64</sup> Because of the difference in contexts and socio-political history of different forms of violence, Weitz and Semelin adopt a restricted form of understanding *genocide*. For them violence becomes *genocide* when it is driven by an explicit

<sup>64</sup> The International Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide on December 9, 1948 set by the United Nations. General Assembly Resolution 260A (III) Article 2.

ideology of national purification and cleansing.<sup>65</sup> Valentino goes beyond a restricted view to see *genocide* as a large-scale atrocity that is focused on the systematic physical destruction of groups, regardless of group identity or perpetrator motivation.<sup>66</sup> Shaw argues that *genocide* goes beyond mere physical destruction to include the destruction of a group's identity as well. This includes the drive to annihilate a group's way of life, social networks, institutions and values. This amounts to destroying the social power of the targeted groups, to weaken them into submission and dominance.<sup>67</sup> It is a *master concept* that represents various forms of violence aimed at eradicating the life and identity of the targeted group.<sup>68</sup>

Whatever the controversies surrounding the understanding of *genocide*, the ongoing violent conflict in Taraba State and the atrocities committed by the Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen demonstrate certain features that might cautiously be considered as *genocide*. From the evidence presented above, there is an ongoing killing, causing of bodily and mental harm and the deliberate infliction of physical destruction. Additionally, these acts are committed with intent to destroy a particular religious group, in this case the Christians. Ethnically, they are also targeted as indigenous groups such as the Jukuns, Kutebs, Chambas, Kakas, Panso, Kaambu, Bandawa and especially the Tiv people who are 99% Christians. In a way, the killings are driven by a religious supremacist ideology to ensure Islam dominates all aspects of life in Taraba State. The Taraba conflict indicates that there is a Muslim agenda and a deliberate drive to propel Islam into dominating all aspects of life, social networks, institutions and values in Taraba State. From the above data, it is clearly Christians that are being killed. Again, it is Christian churches, houses, farmlands and shops that are being destroyed. Most significantly, it is the Christians that are displaced, forced to abandon their homes and ancestral land for Muslims to occupy, dominate and rule over.

## Part Four: Framing the religious and ideological motivation for the ongoing conflict

### Environmental degradation or Islamic jihad

Within government circles and among policymakers, the ongoing atrocities committed against indigenous Christian farmers by the Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen are due to contestation over land and environmental resources. The NCSAN team interviewed senior officials of the Taraba State government who stated: "The first cause of this conflict is about people wanting to have land in order to farm and to do other activities there."<sup>69</sup> Years before Boko Haram emerged, this conflict has been going on in Taraba State - the state and federal governments simply looked on while the Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen had a field day. In May 2014, acting governor Garba Umar set up the Taraba Peace Initiative, headed by Bishop Charles Yohanna, and a controversial peace agreement was signed

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<sup>65</sup> Weitz, Eric, 2005. "A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation", Princeton: Princeton University Press; Semelin, Jacques, 2007. "Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide", New York: Columbia University Press.

<sup>66</sup> Valentino, Benjamin A., 2004. "Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century", Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

<sup>67</sup> Shaw, Martin, 2007. "What is Genocide?", Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 33-34.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid: 78.

<sup>69</sup> Interview, senior official of the Taraba State Government, Jalingo, June 2015.

by the state chairman of Jukun Cultural Association, Zando Hoku; the state chairman of Tiv Cultural and Development Association; James Nugwa, signed on behalf of the Tiv people while the state chairman of Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association, Alhaji Mafindi Danburam, signed on behalf of the Fulanis.<sup>70</sup> Yet many accused the acting governor of using this agreement to force the indigenous Christian farmers to lay down their arms,<sup>71</sup> only later for helicopters “to drop weapons for the ‘insurgents’ allegedly provided by powerful Muslims in the state.”<sup>72</sup> “Insurgents” is clearly a reference to the Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen.

Apart from this peace initiative, no serious measures were taken to address and finally end issues of unrest in the state. In the context of Boko Haram - Boko Haram victims were resettled in official government camps, donations and relief materials from embassies and international NGOs poured in and the media was alert to reporting what was happening in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states - the violent conflict in Taraba State became invisible. No considerations were made for the people of Taraba who were displaced in their tens of thousands. Media houses too were very reluctant to report the conflict in Taraba; where reports were made, the issues were limited to mere environmental degradation and contestation over land.<sup>73</sup> If anything, the Taraba State government argued that the “Tarabans displaced and living at the Nigeria/Cameroon border in Southern Adamawa state are victims of the Boko Haram conflict and not the Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen.”<sup>74</sup> Yet peace initiatives were established by Christian groups, led by the Catholic Diocese of Jalingo.

In the context of the environmental degradation narrative peddled by government and policy makers, empirical evidence based on the data collected, and the detailed information provided by victims on the ground demonstrates the contrary. It shows there is a systematic and strategic scheme to dispossess lands and properties belonging to Christians. Furthermore, it indicates that there is a calculated attempt to substantially displace Christians and the presence of Christianity from areas under attack. Thus, the atrocities committed by the Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen is a form of jihad to ensure that Islamic presence takes precedence over any civil, social and political institution in those areas. Consequently, how can the perception within official circles and the reality on the ground be reconciled and explained? How should the ongoing violent conflict in Taraba State be analyzed and understood? If the conflict is all about land and environmental resources, why are Christians mostly the targets and victims? Why are churches burned down and presbyteries and pastors’ residences attacked? Why are properties, shops, farms and businesses belonging to Christians destroyed in Wukari, Bali, Mutum Biyu and other towns and villages? Why are Christians not allowed to become traditional rulers in most parts of the state? Why will farm products belonging to indigenous Christian farmers be used as animal feed for Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen? Why are Christians forced to relocate to other states and border regions, while Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen are welcomed and allowed to settle in these disputed areas? Taraba State is a Christian majority state in the northeastern region. It is deeply divided along religious lines

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<sup>70</sup> Ogunmade, Omololu and Ayodele, Wole, 2014. “Taraba Warring Communities Sign Peace Agreement.” This Day, accessed July 17, 2014. <http://www.thisdaylive.com>.

<sup>71</sup> Interview, senior member of the Tiv Cultural Group, Bali LGA, Taraba State.

<sup>72</sup> Ogunmade, Omololu and Ayodele, Wole, 2014. “Taraba Warring Communities Sign Peace Agreement.” This Day, accessed July 17, 2014. <http://www.thisdaylive.com>.

<sup>73</sup> Danfulani, Kieran, 2015. “A Neglected State and a Persecuted Church”, unpublished article.

<sup>74</sup> Interview, senior official of the Taraba State Government, Jalingo, June 2013.

between Christians who are mostly indigenous farmers, and settler communities that are mostly permanent Hausa-Fulani Muslims or Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen. To unearth the religious and ideological motivation for the systematic targeting of Christians in Taraba State in recent years, it is only fair to comment briefly on the general opinions expressed by some commentators on the reasons for the conflict.

Public opinion in northern Nigeria directed by the government, policy makers, the media and some international organizations suggest that the violent conflict in Taraba State is due to environmental degradation, migration and contestation over fertile grazing and farming fields in the state. With regards to the media, radio broadcasts play an important role in informing and constructing public opinion. Importantly, the radio still remains very significant and in this context, the Hausa service of the BBC, VOA, Radio France and Radio Germany too. The reporters and news anchors are mostly Hausa-Fulani Muslims, whose news-reports and analyses can hardly be considered neutral.<sup>75</sup> Furthermore, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the U. S. State Department, published its 2008 report and described the conflict in Taraba as a “decades old tribal feud over farmland and political power.”<sup>76</sup> Environmental degradation is generally understood as the depletion of environmental resources which ultimately endangers the existence of living things and forces man to look for survival. According to Hugo, migration whether permanent or temporary, has always been a traditional response and a survival strategy for people faced with the impact of war, natural disasters or the consequences of environmental degradation.<sup>77</sup> In modern times, more than ever before, the complex nature of human disasters coupled with the destruction of the environment due to human activity has uprooted large numbers of people from their communities to new abodes as they search for survival.<sup>78</sup> Currently, northern Nigeria is estimated to be going through extreme problems of environmental degradation from deforestation and low rainfall. It is a region that lies on the edge of the Sahara desert, with a scanty savannah belt,<sup>79</sup> suffering from desert encroachment, shortage of water and soil erosion.<sup>80</sup> In contrast however, Taraba State shares the environmental features of the Middle Belt Region and southern Nigeria. It has plenty of vegetation, with abundant rainfall and arable land for cultivation.

The proponents of the environmental narrative argue that the violent conflict in Taraba State is more about land and resources rather than religion. For them, the agricultural advantages of Taraba State has over the years attracted Hausa-Fulani Muslim settlers, including Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen who have migrated from northern states like Gombe, Katsina, Kano, Sokoto, as well as across the border from Chad, Niger and Cameroon, to settle and farm. They are simply considered environmental and economic migrants.<sup>81</sup> The arrival of these settlers and herdsmen over the years means stiff competition over space and environmental resources with indigenous Christian farmers

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<sup>75</sup> Interview, senior member of the Taraba State University, Jalingo, October 8, 2015.

<sup>76</sup> US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Nigeria, March 11, 2008 Report. [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov) › ... › Africa (accessed 28 July 2015).

<sup>77</sup> Hugo, Graeme, 1996. “Environmental Concerns and International Migration,” *International Migration Review* 30:1: 105-131.

<sup>78</sup> Oliver-Smith, Anthony, 2006. “Disasters and Forced Migration in the 21st Century, Understanding Katrina”, *Perspectives from Social Sciences*, 11 June 2006.

<sup>79</sup> Lavers, John, 1981. “Kane and Bornu to 1808”, in *Groundwork of Nigerian History*, edited by Obaro Ikime, Ibadan: Heinemann, p. 187.

<sup>80</sup> Ndurwa J. Y. 1983. ‘A Survey of Refuse Collection and Disposal in Maiduguri’ B.Sc. (Agric) Project.

<sup>81</sup> Nnoli, Okwudiba, 1978. “Ethnic Politics in Nigeria”, Enugu: Forth Dimension Publishing Company, p. 159.



such as the Tiv, Jukun, Mumuye, Kona and the Kuteps. Consequently, the ongoing conflict is seen to be more about land and environmental resources than religion. A senior member of the Muslim Council of Taraba asserted that “Anyone who tells you that the conflict in Taraba State is between Christians and Muslims is lying. This conflict is not about religion, rather it is about land. It is about people refusing to allow others to come into their land and settle.”<sup>82</sup> Those who lean towards this point of view maintain that the two opposing groups, settlers and the indigenes, belong to two different religions, Islam and Christianity. As such, any violent conflict between them is likely to be interpreted in terms of religious differences rather than fundamental issues central to the violent conflict in the first place.

Yet arguments as outlined above are flawed on many fronts. This perspective limits the historical migration of Muslims into non-Muslim territories (such as Taraba State) to the issue of environmental resources alone, clearly denying the underlying religious agenda and missionary efforts of early Muslims to islamize Taraba State as recorded by Fremantle, an expert on the Muri Emirate.<sup>83</sup> Additionally, it denies the principles contained in the Fulani Jihad’s Manifesto, traced back to Dan Fodio in 1820. This manifesto, among many other things, outlined how Fulani Muslim herdsmen can conquer pagan territories, live in urban communities, exercise influence among rulers and still retain links with their kinsmen.<sup>84</sup> The argument also undermines the role of the colonial administration in the institutionalization of inferior status for non-Muslim groups in northern Nigeria, some of which are groups in Taraba State. In other words, colonial administration played a significant role in promoting the spread and solidification of the Islamic agenda to conquer and dominate other parts of the north,<sup>85</sup> an agenda this research believes is still at play in Taraba State as explained below. Furthermore, continuous emphasis on environmental resources and contestation over land denies the current reality on the ground. Recent findings demonstrate that the atrocities committed by Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen in Taraba State are targeted at indigenous Christian farmers, particularly in central and southern Taraba. In these areas, it is Christians that are killed and displaced, their land and farms taken over, their shops burnt and businesses destroyed. As argued in this research, it is necessary to shift the debate. The research shifts the debate away from the issue of environment and migration to analyze the Islamic legacy of domination through *darul Islam*, and how the perpetuation of the Islamic jihad to dominate the entire Middle Belt Region, to which Taraba State belongs, continues to make Christians the victims of this ongoing violent conflict.

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<sup>82</sup> Interview, senior member of the Muslim Council, Taraba State, 16 June 2015.

<sup>83</sup> Fremantle J.M. (ed.) “Gazetteer of Muri Province”, London: Frank Cass (1919) pp. 18 & 38.

<sup>84</sup> Biyar A.D.H., 1961. “The Wathiqat ahl, al-Sudan: A Manifesto of the Fulani Jihad.” *Journal of African History*. **2(2)**:235-343. This manifesto is considered one of the oldest original documents to have survived, and goes back as far as the year 1820. It contains letters and documents issued by Uthman dan Fodio (son of a jurist) and is alleged to bear the seals of Muhammad Bello, the Sultan of Sokoto, Muhammad al-Amin, the Sultan of Bornu (now el-Kanemi of Borno).

<sup>85</sup> Turaki, Y., 1982. “The Institutionalization of the Inferior Status and Socio-Political Role of the Non-Muslim Groups in the Colonial Hierarchical Structure of the Northern Region of Nigeria: A Social-Ethical Analysis of the Colonial Legacy”. PhD. Boston: Boston University Graduate School, p. 87.

## Reasons why Christians are the victims in Taraba State

### Promotion of Islam by the Dan Fodio jihad

In the period before colonialization, Islam - both as an established presence in the Kanem-Borno Empire and later in the Sokoto Caliphate - tried to penetrate some of the territories that today make up Taraba State, and encountered massive resistance from the Kwararafa Kingdom in southern Taraba (present day Wukari).<sup>86</sup> In the period 1804 -1856, Uthman dan Fodio (1754 – 1817) waged a jihad and conquered the former Hausa states and the entire northern bank of the river Benue from the Nupe, Nassarawa, Bauchi and Zaria emirates<sup>87</sup> including the non-Muslim areas of southern Kaduna.<sup>88</sup> In Taraba State, the emirate of Muri was established in 1817, the northern part (present day Jalingo, the state capital) for the purpose of dominating the non-Muslim indigenous tribes who were both Christians and animists.<sup>89</sup> Prior to this time, in 1710, two Franciscan Catholic priests set out to visit Borno from Tripoli (Libya), but their destination was the Kwararafa Kingdom in northeastern Nigeria, a state they heard had resisted Islamic invasion.<sup>90</sup> A survey was made by the two priests to set out future missionary activities of building schools, hospitals and other social amenities that would accompany the spread of the Christian message. The effort of Christian missionaries at this time was scuttled by the dominant Islamic conquest. The relationship between indigenous people and the invading Muslim armies was that of tribute payment or *jizya* (protection tax).

Abdulkadir writes: "The issue of tribute payment featured prominently in the Muslims extension into non-Muslim areas. In 1854, the Aku of Wukari paid a tribute of between 35 to 40 slaves to the ruler of Muri. Jukun rulers also gave corn, horses, slaves, cloths and so on as tribute to the Emir of Bauchi, but they maintained their traditional religious beliefs."<sup>91</sup> The failure to pay these tributes, the Muslim rulers argued, triggers the religious duty to raid, conquer and plunder non-Muslim territories usually justified on the theological basis of the principle of *darul al-Islam*. It is an Islamic principle that divides the world into *dar-al-Islam*, the house of Islam, and *dar-al-harb*, the house of war.<sup>92</sup> The two houses are in a constant state of war, which the house of Islam will eventually win through jihad. Jihad therefore means fighting the infidels - i.e. the pagans who belong to the house of war and reject the Islamic faith - till their territories are completely brought under the house of Islam.<sup>93</sup> On the basis of this principle, the emir of Muri, Burba dan Hamman (c. 1869-1873) waged unsuccessful military campaigns in 1860s and 1870s directed against indigenous communities, particularly the Tiv, who rejected Islam in favor of Christianity.<sup>94</sup> There was also interest in controlling trade routes and

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<sup>86</sup> Young M. W., 1966. "Divine Kingship of the Jukuns: A Re-Evaluation of some Theories", in *Africa*, xxxvi: 135-152; Mohammed A. R. 1968. "History of the Spread of Islam in the Niger-Benue Confluence Area: Igalaland, Ebiraland and Lokoja c.1900-1960". Ph.D. Kano: Bayero University, p. 76, 111-115.

<sup>87</sup> Laird M and Old-field R.A.K. 1834 (1971). "Narrative of an Expedition into the Interior of Africa by the River Niger in 1832, 1833 and 1834", London: Frank Cass, p. 124-125, 232-235.

<sup>88</sup> Nigeria-Uthman dan Fodio and the Sokoto Caliphate, [http://www.mongabay.com/history/nigeria/nigeria-usman\\_dan\\_fodio\\_and\\_the\\_sokoto\\_caliphate.html#lf7j4lwA9HWhUIq.99](http://www.mongabay.com/history/nigeria/nigeria-usman_dan_fodio_and_the_sokoto_caliphate.html#lf7j4lwA9HWhUIq.99) (accessed 24 August 2014).

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> Umaru, Thaddeus, 2013. "Christian Muslim Dialogue in Northern Nigeria: A Socio-Political and Theological Consideration", Xlibris: USA, p. 37-38.

<sup>91</sup> Abdulkadir, Mohammed Sanni, 2011:7.

<sup>92</sup> Ferguson, John, 1978. "War and Peace in the World's Religions", New York: Oxford University Press, p. 31.

<sup>93</sup> Churchill, Paul, 1991. "Interpreting the Jihad: Militarism Versus Muslim Pacifism", *The Acorn*, p. 20.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

taking slaves to increase the revenue of the caliphate. Yet, it is the indigenous ethnic groups that paid the price.

The period leading up to the formal establishment of British colonial administration in 1900, together with the inspiration derived from the life of Uthman Dan Fodio and the establishment of the caliphate, all meant that the custodians of Dan Fodio's legacies adopted different strategies to continue with this jihad alongside the British struggle in establishing its colonial domination over Nigeria. They adopted political and diplomatic negotiations with the British to maintain Islamic institutions, and the right of Muslims (either Hausa-Fulani Muslims or indigenous Muslim) to rule over traditional societies in most places of northern Nigeria which did not necessarily have a Muslim majority. In 1886, missionary activities in most parts of Taraba State, especially in the north, had to be suspended due to the hostility of some emirs, chiefs and Muslim communities towards the missionaries. Church and missionary buildings were destroyed and church leaders were often summoned before local courts.<sup>95</sup> By 1890 and the apparent dawn of colonial administration, Christianity had (despite some difficulties) made significant contacts and converts in the Middle Belt region, particularly around the Benue-Plateau-Kwararafa axis (present day Wukari, southern Taraba).<sup>96</sup>

Despite the survival of Christianity and the initial consideration that the territories around the Niger and the Benue rivers served as barriers to jihadi incursions into the core non-Muslim areas, the spread of Islam and its jihad was carried out in different forms. For instance, peaceful contacts through travel and trade became one of the most effective means of trying to conquer Taraba territories. These contacts were protected by local Muslim chiefs and the colonial administration. The existence of markets along the Niger-Benue confluence generally populated by the non-Muslim indigenous ethnic groups, attracted Muslim traders from Kano, Zaria, Gobir, Katsina, Borno and Arabs from north Africa, whose twin ambition was to trade and ensure Islam ruled the area. For example, the ivory trade route to Hausaland from Mandara went through the Taraba valley via Gashaka, Bali and Bakundi down to the Benue (all a non-Muslim region).<sup>97</sup> One aspect of Islam's religiously motivated jihad under the colonial administration was to use politics as a spring board to instigate bias and conquer pagan and Christian territories for Islam and for Allah.<sup>98</sup> Additionally, through the colonial policy of employing Muslims, there was a Muslim domination of the northern civil service, such as employment in the colonial military, administrative clerks, semi-skilled workers and other forms of employment as paving the way for the spread of Islam. For example, in 1932 semi-skilled Muslim workers brought in by the colonial administration to work as clerks and in mines in the Jos division alone numbered approximately 12,944.<sup>99</sup> They even accepted work as scribes, clerks and soothsayers to traditionalist leaders, some of whom were yet to convert to Islam as a way of conquering them.<sup>100</sup> In addition to this, the colonial administration "furthered the interests of the Muslims by giving financial support from the Native Treasuries in terms of grants for the annual

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<sup>95</sup> Hickey, Raymond, 2006. "The Growth of the Catholic Church in Northern Nigeria 1907 – 2007", Jos, Nigeria: Augustinian Publications, p. 13-18, 37.

<sup>96</sup> O'Connor, Edward, 2009. "From the Niger to the Sahara: The story of the Archdiocese of Kaduna", Ibadan, Nigeria: SMA Fathers, p. 9-25.

<sup>97</sup> Abdulkadir, Mohammed Sanni, 2011. "Islam in the Non-Muslim Areas of Northern Nigeria, c.1600-1960", in *Ilorin Journal of Religious Studies (IJOURS)*, 1(1):1-20, p. 5.

<sup>98</sup> Turaki Y. 1982. *Op. cit.*

<sup>99</sup> Abdulkadir, Mohammed Sanni, 2011:12.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid*: 1-20.

repairs or construction of mosques, payment of Central Mosques *Imams* and support during religious festivals.”<sup>101</sup>

Before the formal end of colonial administration in 1960, the Hausa-Fulani Muslim oligarchy had put in place strategies to continue with the expansionist ideology of Islam embedded in the Dan Fodio jihad. Sir Ahmadu Bello, the then northern premier, attempted to weld together a political community in the northern part of Nigeria known as Jama’ar Arewa (Northern Congress).<sup>102</sup> In practical terms it was a forceful political marriage between very different and diverse ethnic groups.<sup>103</sup> It was also seen as the recognition of the dominant Hausa-Fulani culture over minority groups in the north.<sup>104</sup> Hausa language was made an official language for the north and became part of the syllabus, while Islam was recognized as the official religion in the north and given a prime place in society. Christians were indirectly made to convert and take Muslim or Hausa-Fulani names. Names of towns and villages in areas of the Middle Belt were given Hausa-Fulani Muslim names.<sup>105</sup> Sharia courts were created, and the council of chiefs and traditional rulers in states and local governments in the north were and are still made up of Muslims only.

It is therefore unfair and unjust to define and limit the killing of indigenous Christian farmers in Taraba State simply to the issue of environmental degradation and contestation over land. The killings are tied to the old Islamic legacy of *darul Islam*, the principles of the Dan Fodio jihad and the need to dominate the Middle Belt region of Nigeria. It is alleged that Dan Fodio was intent on going as far as the Atlantic Ocean in order to dip the Quran into the ocean as a sign of victory. Christians are thus victims of a strategy to implement the Islamic policy of dominating and ruling over Christian and non-Muslim territories. They are also victims of an effort to sustain the colonial legacy that gave undue advantage to the Hausa-Fulani Muslim hegemony over the Middle Belt region, a territory to which Taraba State belongs. Ensuring that Taraba State is seen as a Muslim state in the northeastern region and is brought under the Hausa-Fulani hegemony remains a clear goal - as earlier argued in the April 2015 report titled “Migration and Violent-Conflict in Divided Societies: Non-Boko Haram Violence against Christians in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria” - based on the principle of *darul Islam* (the Islamic community). Consequently, a revised explanation for the ongoing violent conflict in Taraba State, based on the evidence collected, leaves no doubt that an Islamic agenda to dominate the only Christianity majority state in northeastern Nigeria is being implemented. This can be seen at three levels, the first level is domination through traditional institutions, the second level is domination through political control and the third level is domination through violence, in this case, the use of Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen to displace and dispossess indigenous Christian communities of their land and properties.

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid: 13.

<sup>102</sup> Paden, John N., 1986, “Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto, Values and Leadership in Nigeria”, London: Hodder and Stoughton, p. 314.

<sup>103</sup> Paden, John N., 1986. Op. Cit., p. 314.

<sup>104</sup> Kwanashie, George Amale, 2002. “The Making of Northern Nigeria”, 1900-1965, Kaduna, Nigeria: Arewa House, p. 204.

<sup>105</sup> Kukah, Matthew Hassan, 1993. “Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria”, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, p. 9.

### **Domination through traditional institutions**

With colonial conquest and occupation, there emerged a new method of trying to conquer non-Muslim territories like Taraba. Sir Ahmadu Bello, the premier of the northern region has stated: “The new nation called Nigeria should be an estate of our great grandfather Uthman dan Fodio. We must ruthlessly prevent a change of power. We use the minorities in the north as willing tools and the south as conquered territory and never allow them to rule over us and never allow them to have control over their future.”<sup>106</sup> Several inferences can be made from the above. In the first place, the entire country Nigeria, was and is still regarded as part of the Sultanate Empire of Uthman dan Fodio. Again, the Hausa/Fulani Muslim drive to infiltrate, dominate and rule over non-Muslim territories has never declined nor wavered.<sup>107</sup> If anything, it has evolved over the years in different forms and ways, constructing strategies that are both legal and political to dominate non-Muslim territories. Consequently, it can be concluded that the territories of present day Taraba State, which are still not completely conquered by Muslims, are fundamentally part of the Islamic agenda to conquer and dominate. One of the strategies adopted in Taraba State to ensure Islamic domination is the infiltration of traditional chiefdoms and the preservation of Hausa-Fulani Muslim settlers or indigenous Muslim converts as traditional rulers. As indicated in previous research, the preference of Muslims as traditional rulers is predicated on the wisdom of the principle of *Cuius regio, eius religio* (Whose realm, his religion), which means the religion of the ruler dictates the religion of the ruled. Following the spirit of this principle, the Muslims have always ensured that Muslims emerged as traditional rulers in almost all parts of Taraba State. The imposition of Muslims as local chiefs was aimed at favoring and encouraging policies that guarantee the interests of Islam and Muslims. The table below shows the current number of Muslim local chiefs in Taraba State. Out of the 17 recognized traditional rulers in Taraba State, 14 are Muslims, 2 are Traditionalists and only 1 is a Christian.

#### **List of Taraba State traditional rulers and their areas of jurisdiction<sup>108</sup>**

<b>S/n</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Religion</b>
01	His Majesty, Dr. Shekarau Angyu Masa-Ibi Kuvyo 11	Aku-Uka of Wukari, Wukari LGA	Traditionalist
02	His Royal Highness, Alhaji Abbas Njidda Tafida	Emir of Muri, Jalingo LGA	Muslim
03	His Royal Highness, Dr. Stephen Banyong	Gara of Donga, Donga LGA	Christian
04	His Royal Highness, Alhaji Abbas Sambo	Kpanti Zing, Zing LGA	Muslim
05	His Royal Highness, Alhaji Hamman Gabdo Mohammed Sambo	Lamido Gashaka, Gashaka LGA	Muslim
06	His Royal Highness, His Majesty, Dr. Shehu Audu Baju	Chief of Mambila, Sardauna LGA	Muslim
07	Vacant stool, [the former is deceased]	Ukwe Takum, Takum LGA	Traditionalist

<sup>106</sup> The Fulani’s Fear of Uthman dan Fodio’s Dream in [www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/guestarticles](http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/guestarticles) (accessed March 26<sup>th</sup> 2015).

<sup>107</sup> Adamu, Abdulbarkindo and Ben, Alupse, 2015. “Migration And Violent Conflict Societies”, Nigeria Conflict Security Analysis Network (NCSAN), Working Paper NO.1, Abuja, Nigeria p.13 (issued by World Watch Research, 20 March 2015).

<sup>108</sup> Source: Taraba State Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs.

08	His Royal Highness, Alhaji Giddado Mohammed Misa	Chief of Bakundi, Bali LGA	Muslim
09	His Royal Highness, Alhaji Yusuf Manga	Chief of Dakka, Bali LGA	Muslim
10	His Royal Highness, Alhaji Abdul Mohammed Baba Chiroma	Chief of old Muri, Karim-Lamido LGA	Muslim
11	His Royal Highness, Alhaji Abubakar Haruna	Chief of Wurkum, Karim-Lamido LGA	Muslim
12	His Royal Highness, Alhaji Abubakar Sadiq Umar	Chief of Lau, Lau LGA	Muslim
13	His Royal Highness, Alhaji Yakubu Idris Chiroma	Chief of Gassol, Gassol LGA	Muslim
14	His Royal Highness, Alhaji Suleiman Kachalla,	Chief of Mutum Biyu, Gassol LGA	Muslim
15	His Royal Highness, Mallam Adamu Mazang	Chief of Mumuye, Yorro LGA	Muslim
16	His Royal Highness, Alhaji Abubakar Salihu Bawuro	Chief of Ibi, Ibi LGA	Muslim
17	His Royal Highness, Alhaji Buba Nyala	Chief of Kwajji, Yorro LGA	Muslim

In the pre-jihad and pre-colonial periods, the traditional ruler was seen as a person who by virtue of his ancestry occupies the throne of an area or a particular ethnic group, appointed in accordance with the customs and traditions of the area.<sup>109</sup> With the arrival of Islam, Islamic rulers had full authority over conquered territories, and the territories were organized and focused on acquiring and maintaining military force. After the establishment of the caliphate, Uthman dan Fodio undertook some reforms. He divided the caliphate into emirates and the emirates further sub-divided into districts. Emirs were appointed by a college of kingmakers, ratified by the caliph/sultan. Emirs began to function both as religious and administrative leaders. They had both the religious duty and administrative obligation to promote Islam, and preside over judicial matters, while leading wars and conquering more territories for Islam.<sup>110</sup> With the coming of the British colonial administration, the indirect rule system was adopted. The system meant taking over existing power structures, harmonizing them and eliminating flagrant abuses of human rights, but otherwise leaving many elements intact. Yet, one of the most significant factors for the indirect system was the colonial drive to cut the cost of governance and forestall rebellion and resistance.<sup>111</sup> Native Authorities were created and the emirs were responsible for those defined areas. This meant that territories of different independent ethnic groups were dismantled, their traditional tools dissolved and put under a single Native Authority presided over by an Emir. In that sense, many indigenous Christian groups found themselves ruled by Emirs.<sup>112</sup> The dissolution of the Native Authorities as Nigeria became independent and the 1976 local government laws changed the status of the Emirs from administrators of local government to advisers.<sup>113</sup> With the creation of more local government areas (LGAs), different ethnic groups demanded the recognition of their traditional thrones and the need

<sup>109</sup> Akinfenwa, Olubusola Bosedo. "Traditional Rulers and the Challenges of Democratization in Nigeria", unpublished article.

<sup>110</sup> Blench, Roger et al., 2006. "The Role of Traditional Rulers in Conflict Prevention and Mediation in Nigeria", DFID, November 2006, p. 11.

<sup>111</sup> Smith, Edwin W., 1937. "Indirect Rule in Nigeria: Miss Perham's Great Book", Journal of the Royal African Society, 36,(144):371-378, p. 371.

<sup>112</sup> Yahaya A.D., 1980. "The Native Authority System in Northern Nigeria 1950-1970", Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University press.

<sup>113</sup> Blench, Roger et al., 2006:13.

for an indigene to be recognized as the chief as against the appointment of Muslims. Yet, in many traditional chiefdoms today, across northern Nigeria, the policy of appointing Muslims as traditional rulers continues with impunity, even if the majority of the people are Christians or Traditionalists.

In the context of Taraba State and from the above statistics, it is obvious that the Muslims control the traditional institution in Taraba State despite the fact that since 1999 Christians have been elected governors. Because of the colonial legacy that empowered Islamic institutions, most traditional rulership in northern Nigeria has been taken over by Muslim families (either settler or indigenous Muslims). It was not until the return of multi-party democracy in 1999 that most indigenous groups with high Christian populations, particularly around the Middle Belt region of Nigeria, began to reject the imposition of Muslims as traditional rulers. This is evident in southern Kaduna, Nasawara State and some parts of Plateau State. Interviews conducted in southern and central Taraba, show the concern that, even in places where Christians are the majority, Muslims are still being imposed on them as their rulers. For instance, despite the huge Christian population in Ibi and Gassol LGAs, there is no Christian traditional ruler listed. In Gassol LGA, the situation is such that there is no single District Head that is a Christian. The situation is the same in Bali LGA. In all this, the Christian Tivs of southern and central Taraba are worst hit. They are denied all forms of recognition as far as traditional institutions are concerned. The areas they occupy from Chihe to Gborbegha, Utella to Doko have a large enough population for a separate and independent chiefdom, yet they are denied such opportunities, including electoral wards in Wukari LGA. The same can be said of Ukuusu to Dan-Anacha and far away Borno-kurukuru in Gassol LGA. In Bali LGA in central Taraba, fieldwork by NCSAN discovered the same problem. For instance, the Ichen, Jibawa, and Nodoro ethnic nationalities do not enjoy traditional recognition in the manner in which the Muslim Hausa-Fulani do in local government.

Field evidence seems to suggest that, due to their religious affiliation, Muslim traditional rulers are not totally against the ongoing killing of Christians in Taraba State. In the spirit of the Muslim *umma*, the Muslim traditional rulers have not been neutral. In keeping with their obligation to help further the Islamic agenda, they are alleged to have supported the atrocities against Christians, particularly against the Tiv Christian farmers. Reliable contacts interviewed in Sabon-Gida accused some of the Muslim traditional rulers in Sabon Gida, Tella and Bali for supporting Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen (and other unidentified Muslim mob groups such as Banu Israil) and arming them as foot soldiers for wanton killings. In Sanseni village of Sabon-Gida, there are allegations that one of the Muslim local chiefs was the strategist for the Muslim militia. He masterminded and coordinated all the attacks in the area and its environs against the Tiv Christians. From testimonies of Christian victims, this is a dominant narrative that is common in most places affected by the annotated conflict.

At the moment (2015), some traditional chiefs in Bali and Gassol LGAs are selling off land belonging to displaced Christians - particularly Tiv farmers - to Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen mostly from Kano, Gombe and other core northern states. A resident of Bayan Dutse, in Bali LGA, told the NCSAN team that his house and that of many others had been sold off by the traditional rulers of the area. At Aungwan Sabondale in nearby Bali town, interviewees confirmed the occupation of their land and the selling of their homes by one of the traditional rulers of the area. The complainants indicated that most of the traditional rulers have vowed to stop displaced Christians from returning to the area, and even if they do return, they will not have access to their land, homes or properties. The

complainants presented the NCSAN team with a letter written by a particular traditional leader in Bali LGA, stopping the burial of Utsua Daar, a 103 year old Christian victim killed during the recent Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen attack. The burial was denied on grounds that the deceased was an infidel and did not belong to the area. Thus, even in death, Christians are rejected in the area. And yet the deceased Utsua Daar was said to have been born and brought up in the area long before the chief in question was born. This opens up a new chapter in the whole crisis.

### **Domination through political control**

Before and after Nigeria's independence, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sark of Sokoto, believed that one of the ways Islam could dominate Nigeria would be through political control.<sup>114</sup> To fulfill this goal, Ahmadu saw himself as heir to Uthman Dan, with the manifest duty to ensure that Nigeria, particularly northern Nigeria becomes Islamized.<sup>115</sup> He identified with Islamic countries and promoted Islamic identity of Northern Nigeria.<sup>116</sup> He actively sought assistance from Muslim countries like Libya, Kuwait, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the Sudan. He got elected vice president of the World Muslim League in 1964.<sup>117</sup> To demonstrate his desire to rule northern Nigeria on Islamic political principles, he publicly announced sending delegations to Pakistan, Libya and the Sudan. These were Islamic countries with an endemic culture of radicalism and a strong political inclination towards theocratic governance. The goal of sending a delegation of Nigerian northern Muslims to these countries was to study and gauge an acceptable format for governing non-Muslims of the north.<sup>118</sup> Three months before he was killed in a coup shortly before the program began, he chose to visit Jalingo, the capital of the present Taraba State. The visit on 16 October 1965 was supposedly to dedicate a government-constructed hospital. However, he used the visit to hold private meetings with Muslim leaders and Hausa-Fulani groups that had settled in the territories of now Taraba State. Prior to these meetings, he publicly stated: "The father of enlightenment and good in this land is the Prophet, Uthman dan Fodio, and the work of salvation for all people which he so nobly undertook has now been handed over to me. I dedicate myself totally to its completion."<sup>119</sup> The reasons for his choice of Taraba for these statements and meetings are obvious. Taraba territories had not yet been fully dominated by Islam. Consequently, there was need for a clear political agenda on how to conquer the Taraba territories. Political power, the Muslims reasoned, will avail them of the platform to implement an Islamic agenda with the support of state institutions. As such, capturing political power, and using it to spread Islam became another strategy in the jihad to conquer Taraba.

The struggle of the Hausa-Fulani Muslim elite to dominate Taraba State politically and through other means has been ongoing. The return to multi-party democracy alerted them and created an opportunity once again to ensure that they dominate the state politically. This explains the reason

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<sup>114</sup> Balogun S. A., 1989. "Islam in Nigeria: Its Historical Development." In *Nigeria since Independence: The First 25 Years*, vol. IX-Religion, edited by Atanda J. A et al, Ibadan, Nigeria: Heineman Educational Books Ltd, p. 54.

<sup>115</sup> Rasmussen, Lissi, 1993. "Christian-Muslim Relations in Africa: The Cases of Northern Nigeria and Tanzania Compared", London and New York: British Academic Press, p. 55. Three months before his death, Ahmadu Bello publicly stated on 16 October 1965 at the dedication of a hospital in Jalingo, capital of present day Taraba State: "The father of enlightenment and good in this land was the Prophet, Uthman Dan Fodio and the work of salvation for all people which he so nobly undertook has now been handed to me. I dedicate myself totally to its completion." Cf. Crampton, E. P. T., 1979. "Christianity in Northern Nigeria", London: Geoffrey Chapman, p. 215f.

<sup>116</sup> Rasmussen, Lissi, 1993. "Christian-Muslim Relations in Africa: The Cases of Northern Nigeria and Tanzania Compared", London and New York: British Academic Press, p. 55.

<sup>117</sup> Iwuchukwu 2013:43.

<sup>118</sup> Crampton E. P. T., 1979. „Christianity in Northern Nigeria”, London: Geoffrey Chapman, p. 215f.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid: 89, also cf. Gilliland, Dean, 1971. "African Traditional Religion in Transition: The Influences of Islam on African Traditional Religion in Northern Nigeria", PhD Dissertation, Hartford, CT, p. 269.



why outside the governorship position in the state, the Hausa-Fulani Muslims are the majority in the number of elective offices to represent the state at the National Assembly. The National Assembly is the gathering of distinguished politicians, elected from different states, to represent their own state constituencies. It is made up of the Upper House – senators, and the Lower House – members of the Federal House of Representatives. In Taraba State, there are three senatorial districts requiring three senators to represent Taraba State in the Upper House and there are 6 Federal Constituencies requiring 6 members to represent Taraba in the Federal House of Representatives. For instance, in the just concluded 7<sup>th</sup> National Assembly (2011-2015), Muslims had 4 members in the House of Representatives as opposed to the Christians with only 2. In the Senate House, Christians had only one senator as opposed to the Muslims with 2 senators. The situation has not changed in the senate in the 8<sup>th</sup> assembly (2015-2019). The only change is in the House of Representatives where Christians have 3 representatives as do the Muslims, reflected by the data below.<sup>120</sup>

#### **Names of Taraba State Federal House of Representatives Members in the 7<sup>th</sup> Assembly 2011-2015**

<b>Constituency</b>	<b>Candidate's Name</b>	<b>Religion</b>
Jalingo/ Yorro/ Zing	Mallam Ibrahim Aminu	Muslim
Takum/Donga/Ussa	Albert Taminu Sam-Tsokwa-	Christian
Wukari/Ibi	Ishaka Mohammed Bawa	Muslim
Ardo-Kola/ Lau/Lamido	Jerimon Sameul Manwe	Christian
Gashaka/Kurmi/Sardauna	Ibrahim Tukur El-Sudi	Muslim
Bali/Gassol	Haruna Manu	Muslim

#### **Senators of the 7<sup>th</sup> Assembly from Taraba State**

<b>Constituency</b>	<b>Candidate's Name</b>	<b>Religion</b>
Taraba North Senatorial District	Aisha Jummai Alhassan	Muslim
Taraba Central Senatorial District	Abubakar Tutare	Muslim
Taraba South Senatorial District	Emmanuel Bwacha	Christian

#### **Names of Taraba State Federal House of Representatives Members in the 8<sup>th</sup> Assembly 2015-2019**

<b>Constituency</b>	<b>Candidate's Name</b>	<b>Religion</b>
Jalingo/ Yorro/ Zing	Aminu Ibrahim Malle	Christian
Takum/Donga/Ussa	Shiddi Usman Danjuma	Muslim
Wukari/Ibi	Aminu Ibrahim Malle	Muslim
Ardo-Kola/ Lau/Lamido	Baido Danladi Tijos	Christian
Gashaka/ Kurmi /Sardauna	Danasabe Charles Hosea	Christian
Bali/Gassol	Garba Hamman-Julde Chede	Muslim

<sup>120</sup> This data was collected by Mr. Benjamin Gudaku, from the National Assembly Service Commission, Abuja, 23 July 2015.

### Senators of the 8<sup>th</sup> Assembly from Taraba State

Constituency	Candidate's Name	Religion
Taraba North Senatorial District	Alh. Sani Abubkar Danladi	Muslim
Taraba Central Senatorial District	Alh. Marafa Bashir Abba	Muslim
Taraba South Senatorial District	Emmanuel Bwacha	Christian

It is significant to ask, how can a Christian majority state like Taraba be dominated by Muslims elected to represent the state in the National Assembly? The reasons are not hard to find. First, party politics in Nigeria is not dictated by majority decisions at the grass-roots but rather by party politics and policies at the national level. Most of the Muslims candidates were selected by the ruling PDP party Secretariat in Abuja when Mallam Mua'zu was the party Chairman. Again, *godfatherism* and corruption has taken hold in both the state and national level politics in Nigeria.

*Godfatherism* is a term used to describe the relationship between a godfather and godson. A godfather is a kingmaker, boss, mentor, and principal, while the godson is the beneficiary and recipient of the legacy of a godfather.<sup>121</sup> In the political set up, the godfather is an individual who possesses considerable means to unilaterally determine who gets a party's ticket to run for an election and who wins in the electoral contest.<sup>122</sup> In this context therefore, the godfather has built up an incredible amount of respect and followers (voters) in the community, and possesses a well-organized political platform, a network within the party at both state and national level and an immense wealth that can buy and secure victory for candidates of his choice even if such a candidate might not have been voted in by the majority. In Nigerian politics, godfathers are powerful individuals who determine who, what, when and how people get into the corridors of power.<sup>123</sup> In Taraba State, prominent Muslim politicians both within and outside the state, have sponsored the imposition of Muslim candidates to represent the state at the National Assembly. This is done through aggressive politicking, manipulation of votes and electoral materials, and by relying on the slogan "the ends justify the means."<sup>124</sup> Furthermore, the ability of Muslims to dominate the National Assembly also shows the role of religious identity in party politics in Taraba State. In other words, though Muslims may dominate, not all of them are Hausa-Fulani Muslim settlers. Some of them are indigenous Muslim converts. While they gather votes from their ethnic groups, they also get support from other Muslims for being Muslims.

Despite the Muslim control of state representatives for Taraba State at the National Assembly, the level of grievance within Muslim communities became apparent, indicating that they will not accept continuous leadership of an "infidel in Taraba State." Governor Danbaba Suntai's (a Christian) first deputy, Abubakar Danladi (a Muslim) was impeached on 4<sup>th</sup> of October, 2012 on the account of gross abuse of office, particularly the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) projects that were under his supervision. However, the real reason for his impeachment, according to reliable sources, was due to his burning ambition, goaded by the prominent Muslims in the state to ensure that the governorship

<sup>121</sup> Adeoye, O.A., 2009. "Godfatherism and the future of Nigerian Democracy." *African Journal of Political Science and International Relation*. 3(6):268-272.

<sup>122</sup> Majekodunmi, Aderonke and Awosika, Felix Olanrewaju, 2013. "Godfatherism and Political Conflicts in Nigeria: The Fourth Republic in Perspective." *International Journal of Management and Social Sciences Research (IJMSSR)* 2(7):70.

<sup>123</sup> Albert, I.O., 2005. "Explaining Godfatherism in Nigerian Politics." *African Sociological Review*. 9(2):79-105.

<sup>124</sup> Edigin, L.U., 2010. "Political Conflicts and Godfatherism in Nigeria: A Focus on the Fourth Republic." *African Research Review: An International Multi-Disciplinary Journal*. 4(4): 174-186.

position of Taraba State comes to the Muslim community.<sup>125</sup> Umar Garba, another Muslim, popularly known in the state as UTC was sworn in as the deputy governor. A few weeks after Umar Garba was sworn in as the new deputy governor of Taraba State, governor Danbaba Suntai (a Christian) was involved in a plane crash on 25th of October 2012 which left him incapable of running Taraba State. Umar Garba was now sworn-in as the acting governor, and for the first time, a Muslim acting governor was in place to pilot the affairs of Taraba State. Findings revealed that there were wide spread jubilations by Muslims in Jalingo, Mutum Biyu, Tella, Gashaka and other towns across the state when news broke that the plane of the Christian governor, Danbaba Suntai, had crashed and that the Muslim, Umar Garba, had been sworn in as acting governor. Muslims fanatics saw the plane crash as an opportunity to achieve their agenda of taking over power in the state at all costs by 2015.

According to the pressure group “Concerned Taraba Tiv Youth Frontier”, plans were made to achieve the Muslim dream of ruling Taraba State, through destabilizing southern and central Taraba (where Christians are the majority) ahead of the 2015 general elections. In November 2014, after being sworn in as acting governor, Umar Garba sacked all commissioners and officials, mostly Christians appointed by governor Danbaba. On a visit to New York, he categorically stated that he will not hand over power to the people of Southern Taraba, a Christian dominated region. Further research indicates that Garba Umar belonged to the radical Islamic sect called Izala. The sect was established in Jos, Plateau State, in March 1978 by the followers of Shaikh Abubakar Gumi, a religious adviser to Sir Ahmadu Bello, the then Premier of northern Nigeria.<sup>126</sup> The sect was named “Jama’atu Izalatil Bid’a wa Iqamat al-Sunna” (Society for the eradication of innovation and the reinstatement of tradition) shortened to Izala.<sup>127</sup> The members of this sect see themselves as the followers of the Prophet Mohammed and his companions (al-salaf al-sahih) and dedicate themselves to the rejection of innovation in Islam (bid’a),<sup>128</sup> including the rejection of any form of authority that is not derived from the Qur’an.

They condemn other Islamic sects that do not follow their teachings; for instance, they forbid their members from reciting Tijaniyya sect’s litany “salat al-fatiha” and consider it as apostasy punishable by death. Marriage to the Tijani rival sect was declared illegal.<sup>129</sup> The sect and its offshoots go further to call for the restoration of the Islamic caliphate abolished by Ataturk Kamel of Turkey in 1922 and chants slogans such as: “Down with the Nigerian constitution” and “Islam only”.<sup>130</sup> Consequently, before relocating to Jalingo, Umar lived in Jos as a well-known fanatical Muslim. He was alleged to have been at one time the secretary-general of the of the Izala sect in Jos.<sup>131</sup> The atrocities of the Izala sect in Nigeria, particularly in Jos is well documented. Garba Umar became acting governor after he settled in Jalingo, away from Jos. Witnesses have indicated that a visit to his house in Jalingo,

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<sup>125</sup> Interview with a current senior official of the Taraba State Government, Jalingo, 8 July, 2015.

<sup>126</sup> Iwuchukwu 2013:47.

<sup>127</sup> Umar, Muhammad S., 1993. “Changing Islamic Identity in Nigeria from the 1960s to the 1980s: From Sufism to anti-Sufism”, in *Muslim Identity and Social Change in Sub-Saharan Africa*, edited by Brenner Louis, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, p. 178.

<sup>128</sup> For a comprehensive study of these sects, cf. Mustapha, Abdul Rauf and Bunza, Mukhtar U., 2014:54-97.

<sup>129</sup> Laremont, Ricardo R., 2011. “Islamic Law and Politics in Northern Nigeria”, Trenton NJ: Africa World Press, p. 157-8.

<sup>130</sup> Bunza, M. U., 2004. “Muslims and the Modern State in Nigeria: A Study of the Impact of Foreign Religious Literature, 1980s - 1990s”, in *Islam et Societes au Sud du Sahara*, 17(18): 49-63.

<sup>131</sup> The authors made several attempts to confirm this from the Izala sect in Jos and Jalingo, but failed.

while he was acting governor, was comparable to Muslims performing the lesser hajj (pilgrimage) as the house was usually filled with members of the Izala sect.<sup>132</sup>

As acting governor, Garba Umar denied that the Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen were responsible for attacks against indigenous Christian farmers, alleging that it was the militia of the Jukun ethnic group dressed as Fulani who attacked Tiv ethnic groups.<sup>133</sup> Strategically, this was intended to absolve the Muslim herdsmen of any blame and pitch two Christian majority ethnic groups – Tiv and Jukuns – against one another. In addition, Umar Garba ratified the appointment of a Fulani Muslim as the paramount ruler of Gembu, an indigenous Christian majority town in Taraba. He also put in every effort to ensure that he was sworn in as the executive governor of the state. As executive governor, he would no longer need the approval of governor Danbaba Suntai, a Christian, to carry out his functions. He would then have obtained the full powers to upgrade the influence of Muslims within political and traditional circles. Umar Garba accused the majority Christians and influential Christian leaders of blocking his confirmation as substantive governor.<sup>134</sup> A security source from the Directorate of State Service (DSS) in Jalingo disclosed that acting governor Umar Garba had used state funds to assist Hausa-Fulani Muslims herdsmen entering the state to resettle in various parts of Taraba. He assured them of grazing lands as long as they would displace the huge Christian communities of the Southern and Central Senatorial Districts.<sup>135</sup> When asked to explain why acting governor Umar would embark on such an agenda, the source said the state was sharply divided along religious lines and it was very likely this would reflect the voting pattern in the 2015 elections. Considering the numerical strength of the Christians, it would be foolhardy to imagine victory at the polls without displacing the Christians first.<sup>136</sup>

To this end, a religious crisis broke out in Ibi local government in December 2013. This was followed by another religious crisis in Wukari on 23 February 2014, and throughout the 25 months of Umar Garba's rule the state was engulfed in a series of crises with over one thousand feared killed, thousands others displaced and property worth billions of naira destroyed. Umar Garba was on the verge of making history as the first Muslim elected governor of the state before he was ousted by the Supreme Court judgment of 21 November 2014 in Abuja, the nation's capital. The Supreme Court upturned the impeachment of Abubakar Danladi, the first deputy governor under governor Suntai Danbaba, on the grounds that he (Abubakar Danladi) was not given fair hearing during the impeachment process. Yet, the Muslim strategy to exploit politics in order to further the Islamic agenda played out clearly in the 2015 general elections. Before the elections, there was deep mutual distrust between Christians and Muslims. The ruling PDP with a Christian gubernatorial candidate, Ishiaku Darius, was seen as a Christian party and the opposition APC with a Muslim candidate, Hajiya Jummai Al-Hassan, was seen as a Muslim party. There was an increase in the use of Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen to attack, displace and dispossess lands and properties belonging to Christians. The continuous displacement of Christians meant that Christians would not have access to

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<sup>132</sup> Interview with residents of Jalingo, June 2015.

<sup>133</sup> Open Letter from Senator Emmanuel Bwacha, Chairman Senate Committee on Agriculture, to the Deputy Governor of Taraba State, Alhaji Garba Umar. Bwacha, a senator from the Southern Senatorial District, refuses to recognise Garba Umar as acting governor and attributed the blame for the atrocities of the Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen to Garba Umar. [www.todayinabuja.com/...letter-garba-umar-acting-governor-taraba-state](http://www.todayinabuja.com/...letter-garba-umar-acting-governor-taraba-state) (accessed 29 July 2015).

<sup>134</sup> Interview with resident of Mutum-Biyu, Gassol LGA, on 2 July 2015.

<sup>135</sup> Interview with resident of Wuse Zone 4, Abuja, on 29 June 2015.

<sup>136</sup> Interview with resident of Wuse Zone 4, Abuja, on 29 June 2015.

Permanent Voters Cards (PVCs). Evidence for this became obvious when the former state commissioner for finance under Umar Garba's administration, Sa'ad Ajuji, who comes from Sabon-Gida town of Gassol LGA, collected over 15,000 PVCs belonging to the displaced Christians and manipulated the elections to favor a Muslim candidate, Aisha Alhassan.<sup>137</sup> This pattern was repeated throughout central and southern Taraba. A resident of Takum argued that at first instance the violent conflict was all about getting rid of the Christian population to pave the way for the emergence of a Muslim governor in the Taraba State 2015 general election. Now it is all about getting rid of the Christian population and to dominate the area.<sup>138</sup> This position is widely held within Christian circles in Taraba State. One of the pastors in the area asked that, if the violent conflict is not religious, why were they burning churches and attacking only Christians?<sup>139</sup> This pattern of violence continued even after another Christian, Darius Dickson Ishaku, from Takum LGA, was elected the executive governor on the platform of the PDP in May 2015. The attacks became more open as the 2015 general elections approached.<sup>140</sup>

Political machinations played a significant role in the Muslim success at the National Assembly elections. One source said that the ploy by the Muslims to cause the crisis paid off during the election as their candidates won elections for various seats in the National Assembly. For instance, out of the 9 seats allocated to Taraba State in the National Assembly both in the Upper and Lower houses, Muslims won 5 of the seats while Christians won 4. Muslims have won seats in the central and southern constituencies of Taraba State that are predominantly Christian. Such areas include Bali/Gassol, Wukari/Ibi, Takum/Donga/Ussa federal constituencies, and Taraba north and central senatorial districts. One of the reasons for this Muslim victory is that most of the Christian population in these areas had already been displaced by the conflict. This is in contrast to the governorship election which was conducted along religious lines. Despite the displacement, many of the Christians were still able to vote and their votes were counted. Out of the 16 LGAs in Taraba State, Ishaku Darius, the Christian candidate of the PDP won 10: Ardo Kola, Lau, Yorro, Zing, Karim Lamido, Wukari, Takum, Donga, Ussa and Kurmi, obtaining 369,318 votes. The candidate of the All Progressive Congress, APC, Hajjiya Aisha Jummai Alhassan (a Muslim) won in 6 LGAs: Jalingo, Gassol, Ibi, Sardauna, Bali, and Gashaka, obtaining 275,984 votes.<sup>141</sup>

The drive to ensure that Muslims rule Taraba State is all part of the Islamic agenda to dominate the area. Taraba State happens to be the only state in the north-east zone governed by a Christian governor. With the expansionist tendency that is embedded in the jihad movement, it is obvious that the Hausa-Fulani Muslims are fanatic about conquering the state and making it an Islamic one.<sup>142</sup> The manner in which these attacks are carried out tells us more of the Islamic ideology behind them. You often hear the shouts "Allahu akbar", an Arabic phrase meaning "Allah is great", and the Hausa phrase "Za mu karbe kasar arna", meaning "We shall confiscate the land of the infidels". Statements such as these are clear indications of the undertones of this crisis. From the way these battles have been fought, one can see that there have been campaigns for the Islamization of the non-Muslim or non-Hausa-Fulani in the north. Some of those involved in attacks are alleged to be Hausa-Fulani

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<sup>137</sup> Interview with resident of Sabon-Gida, Gassol LGA, on 7 July 2015.

<sup>138</sup> Interview with resident of Takum, Takum LGA, on 16 July 2015.

<sup>139</sup> Interview with resident of Bali, Bali LGA, on 18 July 2015.

<sup>140</sup> Interview with resident of Gindin Dorowa, Wukari LGA on 10 April 2015.

<sup>141</sup> Independent National Electoral Commission, Jalingo, Taraba State, July 2015.

<sup>142</sup> Interview with resident of Mutum-Biyu, Gassol LG on 15 April 2015.

Muslim herdsmen from other parts of northern Nigeria.<sup>143</sup> This suggests some nature of collaboration and constant influx of Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen from other parts into Taraba State.

The manner in which the acting governor Umar Garba, a Muslim, responded to these violent conflicts leaves much to be desired. His ambition to take the executive governorship made him compromise on peace within the state.<sup>144</sup> Throughout this crisis there was limited worldwide media coverage.<sup>145</sup> State appointed journalists reported on the conflict, presenting it as the handiwork of opposition elements within the state. Journalists who attempted a detailed coverage of the conflict were sacked or interrogated. Official state permission for independent investigators and researchers was denied. Requests for documents related to the conflict were ignored. Only a group called “Concerned Taraba Tiv Youth Frontier” successfully brought out press releases periodically and held press conferences to condemn the killings. They claimed they were being attacked for speaking out about the human rights abuses of Christians in the state. Many saw the crisis as a ploy by the acting governor to destabilize the southern part of the state, a strong Christian stronghold, so that he might emerge as governor at the general elections.<sup>146</sup> Through a court ruling Umar Garba was removed and the earlier impeached deputy governor, Sani Danladi, was returned to office as acting governor.

Field evidence indicates that recent killings in Taraba State are religiously motivated, with the aim of Muslim elites achieving political gains. This makes the explanation plausible offered by victims of the conflict, namely that it is a crass case of using politics as a decoy for a religious agenda. Findings and explanations in this section of the report seem to substantiate this claim, especially judging from the political evolution of events that snowballed into open conflict. It needs to be pointed out that the ongoing conflict in Taraba State that started in 2013 has a very different nature and outlook from any other kind of violent attack hitherto witnessed in the state. While it is undoubtedly true that various inter- and intra-ethnic violent conflicts have taken place in the state, evidence gathered and interviews conducted in Wukari, Gindin-Dorowa, Dan-Anacha and Jatau (among other towns) suggest strongly that the violent attacks and killings of Christians are a clear attempt to dispossess Christians of their land and dominate their territories. Recently, a Christian IDP died and was returned to his home-town for burial, only to have the funeral banned by the Hausa-Fulani Muslim chief.

### **Domination through attacks by Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen**

As the data on the current violent conflict perpetuated by Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen against indigenous Christian farmers indicated earlier, it is obvious that indigenous Christian farmers - particularly the Tiv ethnic group which is 99% Christian - have been under constant attack in Taraba State. Witnesses argue that the ongoing killing and displacement of indigenous Christian farmers by the Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen became prominent in the year 2000 when some Hausa-Fulani herdsmen attacked indigenous Christian farmers known as Mambila in Gembu. The situation degenerated into a violent conflict that “claimed many human and animal lives.”<sup>147</sup> There were several other violent conflicts between the Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen and indigenous Christian farmers that emerged in Lau, Ardo-Kola and Jalingo LGAs at different times. Towards the last quarter of 2013 leading to 2015, Christian communities in southern Taraba senatorial district and those on

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<sup>143</sup> Interview with resident of Bataje, Wukari LG on 10 April 2015.

<sup>144</sup> Interview with resident of Jalingo on 15 April 2015.

<sup>145</sup> Interview with resident of Jalingo on 15 April 2015.

<sup>146</sup> Interview with resident of Jalingo on 15 April 2015.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid: 64.

the fringes of the central senatorial district (especially in Gassol and Bali LGAs), have come under attack from the Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen causing many deaths, including women and children. Another example is Gassol LGA, where villages such as Borno-Kurukuru, Nyamtsav, Orga, Igbough, Tyougese, Orshio, Ukuusu (as well as many others) have been ransacked by Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen destroying farms, and burning homes and churches. A major outbreak of violent conflict in recent times was in February 2013 at Wukari, the headquarters of Wukari LGA and 202 kilometers from Jalingo, the state capital. This conflict spread to other towns and villages in Wukari LGA including Son-di, Vaase, Jandekyula, Gidin-Dorowa, Jibu, Mbaju, Aken, Ankunya and Kwagh Aondo. Over ten thousand Christians were displaced and their houses and farmlands taken over by the Hausa-Fulani herdsmen.<sup>148</sup> An interview with one of the survivors from Wukari revealed that close to 500 people were killed (both Christians and Muslims), while many schools, Christian churches, and hospitals were burned down.<sup>149</sup> There was no independent confirmation of this. While we obtained data from the Catholic Diocese of Jalingo and some other Christian denominations, the Muslim Council of Taraba State was unwilling to furnish the NCSAN team with data on the number of Muslims killed or mosques destroyed.

Ibi, the headquarters of Ibi LGA, had its own share of violence in November 2014. It was on a Sunday, a day on which Christians go to worship, that the Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen struck. Many churches and houses of Christians were torched. The famous College of Immaculate Conception was not spared in this wave of violence. The shops of Igbo Christian traders were looted and burned down while thousands of Christians fled the town vowing not to go back there again.<sup>150</sup> Equally, Dampar and Sarkin-Kudu areas of Ibi LGA were not spared in these attacks. Villages such as Maihula, Sabondale, Gazabu, Garbabi under Bali LGA were under heavy attack in June 2014. About 30 persons were killed in these areas and thousands displaced while church structures at Ate, Lorunde, Kav, Azoratar, Agondo, Gborboomi, Orahii, Atsegha, Tuna, Lornimbe, Lorshe, Yongo, Ukula, Gbagile and Urmbuga were burned down to ashes.<sup>151</sup> Nursery/Primary schools established in these areas by Christian communities for the education of their children were equally vandalized. Dozens of houses belonging to Christians were completely destroyed.<sup>152</sup> Furthermore, in Gassol LGA, there had been a systematic plot to rid the entire area of any Christian population. It is systematic because the farmlands of Tiv farmers, who are 99% Christian, are often confiscated and handed over to Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen for grazing.<sup>153</sup> Prior to this (in 2010), a group of concerned Christians wrote a petition to the local emir and copied it to the chairman of Gassol LGA and to the executive governor decrying the oppression and the injustice meted out to them because of their faith.<sup>154</sup> In places such as Imouma, Upev, Shimasaka, Atsua, Asongu, Shiiki, Anliva, and Sabon-Gida Takai, Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen simply took over already cultivated farms with food crops, for cattle grazing. This was followed by the demolition of churches, presbyteries, Christian clinics, health centers and schools in Dinya and Orgah.<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> Interview with resident of Wukari on 18 February 2015.

<sup>149</sup> Interview with resident of Wukari on 18 February 2015.

<sup>150</sup> Interview with resident of Ibi on 25 January 2015.

<sup>151</sup> Interview with resident of Bali on 25 March 2015.

<sup>152</sup> Interview with resident of Bali on 25 March 2015.

<sup>153</sup> Interview with resident of Tella, Gassol LG on 30 March 2015.

<sup>154</sup> Interview with resident of Tella, Gassol LG on 30 March 2015.

<sup>155</sup> Interview with resident of Dinya, Gassol LG on 31 March 2015.

In March 2015, violent conflict broke out in Tella, Gassol LGA in which six Christian churches were completely destroyed and 3 Christians lost their lives. The shops of Igbo traders, who are mainly Christians, were targeted, looted and completely vandalized. Two Christian schools were destroyed and thousands were made to flee for their lives. Another area that came under attack by Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen was Donga LGA. At Sabongida Isha, a Catholic church, the presbytery, and over 500 Christian houses would have been destroyed.<sup>156</sup> This attack was extended to the villages of Dogo and Ananum on 25 March 2015.<sup>157</sup> Evidence suggests that indigenous Christian communities are under attack - particularly the Tiv ethnic group who are 99% Christians. These attacks are conducted by Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen who are well organized and well-armed, with a specific goal, namely to displace indigenous Christian farmers and occupy their land, their houses and their farms. In this context, churches are targeted, set on fire and destroyed (as found in the data provided by the Catholic Diocese of Jalingo and other Christian church organizations. Presbyteries and pastors' residences, vehicles and properties are not spared. Farms, business, shops and houses belonging to Christians, unlike those of their Muslim counterparts are destroyed or vandalized. Farm produce from Christian farms and fields are harvested and turned into animal feed. Sometimes, these actions are carried out by Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen shielded by traditional rulers who are themselves Hausa-Fulani or Muslims.

In the opinion of some observers, the conflict is not exactly ethnic since other ethnic groups such as Igbo, Mumuye and Ogoja, who are non-Tiv but Christian, have also been attacked around Gazabo, Maihula and Nahuta areas of Bali LGA. In Ibi and Wukari too, the Jukun Christians, like the Tiv, have come under attack by the Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen, supported by other Muslims who have settled in and around these towns.<sup>158</sup> The whole idea is to weed out the Christian population to pave the way for Muslims, some of whom are not even Nigerians, to take over farmlands. In Mutum-Biyu, Sabon-Gida and Tella (Gassol LGA), there are unconfirmed reports of a heavy influx of non-Nigerian Muslims who are taking over farms of Christians that have been displaced. Some of the survivors interviewed in Mutum Biyu told NCSAN that the grand plan to kill and forcefully evacuate the Christian population is so perfected that the media is forbidden to even talk about it.<sup>159</sup> This probably explains why the local media is simply silent over the matter and why the international media is held hostage by one storyline, Boko Haram, and is unable to talk about these other killings and displacements. NCSAN observes that there is no single government-designated camp for the displaced. Rather, the displaced are taking refuge within seemingly secured churches in urban centers such as St. Paul's Catholic Church in Bali, St. Mary's Catholic Church in Wukari, and Holy Trinity Catholic Church in Takum (among others).

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<sup>156</sup> Interview with resident of Donga on 2 April 2015.

<sup>157</sup> Interview with resident of Donga on 2 April 2015.

<sup>158</sup> Interview with resident of Bali, Bali L.G.A. on 18 July 2015.

<sup>159</sup> Interview with residents in Garba-Chede, Bali LGA on 18 July 2015.



## Conclusion

For many years, the violent conflict going on in Taraba State has always been unfairly described as contestation over land and environmental resources between farmers and herdsmen. The central focus of this research was to question this narrative in the light of new findings. In line with this, the article has examined the conceptual and theoretical framework of divided societies and the nature of violent conflict in the context of Taraba State. It presented a comprehensive history of Taraba State to underscore the nature of past violent conflicts and the underlying structural factors that have motivated such conflicts. Equally, the presentation of the comprehensive history of Taraba State was intended to show the evolution of violent conflicts within the state and why Taraba - being a Christian majority state - will remain an area of interest for Muslim domination. Consequently, data showing the atrocities of Fulani-Muslim herdsmen in Taraba State was compiled between 2013 and 2015. The data is categorized at three levels: the number of people killed, the number of existing IDP camps and IDPs living there, and the number of churches and properties destroyed. From the data collected, evidence suggests that there is a sophisticated and systematic attack on Christians in Taraba State, particularly in the central and southern parts of the state. Several thousands of Christians have been killed, hundreds of churches, houses and shops destroyed, tens of thousands of Christians displaced, their farmlands and villages taken over by the Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen. There are no data available on Muslim victims, because nobody was willing to give data.

This new evidence does not fit in with the narrative of the land-environmental resource theorists who link the violent conflict in Taraba State to contestation over environmental resources. In contrast, the research asserts that the ongoing violent conflict in Taraba State is linked to the historical migration of Muslims into non-Muslim territories like Taraba in northern Nigeria to promote the Islamic religious and missionary agenda in Islamizing all parts of northern Nigeria. Additionally, it is a fulfilment of the recommendation contained in the Fulani Jihad's manifesto, traced back to Dan Fodio in 1820, which outlines how Fulani Muslim herdsmen can conquer and dominate non-Muslim territories. Again, it shows how Muslim elite in northern Nigeria continue to maximize the legacies of the colonial past, exploiting politics to promote an Islamic agenda and to ensure that Islam dominates places like Taraba State, a Christian majority state in northeastern Nigeria. To expand on this, the research analyzed the violent conflict in Taraba State from three perspectives: the domination of Christian territories through traditional institutions, domination through political control, and the use of Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen to continue with the Dan Fodio jihad. The evidence for this can be seen in the nature and extent of destruction targeted specifically at Christians in Taraba State as outlined in the tables above. In fact, for many people the atrocities committed by the Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen can be, at best, described as *ethnic cleansing*, and at worst, as *genocide*. This is because, from the evidence presented, there is a deliberate and calculated infliction of physical destruction, targeted at particular religious and ethnic groups. Such destruction is supported and driven by a religious supremacist ideology to ensure Islam dominates all aspects of life in Taraba State.

While Hausa-Fulani Muslims seek to dominate all aspects of life in non-Muslim territories in northern Nigeria and promote an Islamic agenda, important questions need to be posed here: Can the non-Muslim groups, Christians and Traditionalists found in northern Muslim states, be allowed to assert themselves in those states, let alone be allowed access to any meaningful leadership positions? What sustains the Hausa-Fulani Muslim domination of areas and territories that do not belong to them?

Why should the Hausa-Fulani Muslim continue to promote a religious supremacist ideology, placing Islam over and above other religions like Christianity and the African Traditional Religion, insisting that Islam and Muslims should dominate the religious, traditional and political spheres of Taraba State? The fact of history remains that some Christian majority states in central Nigeria, such as Taraba state successfully resisted the Uthman dan Fodio jihad of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Consequently, in whatever form this ancient jihad is resurrected and promoted today in northern Nigeria, particularly in Taraba State, there is a high degree of religious and ethnic consciousness amongst faith and tribal groups in Taraba State. Despite this degree of religious consciousness, the persecution of Christians in Taraba State continues. Traditional institutions are dominated by Muslims, churches are being destroyed while lands and properties belonging to Christians are taken away. Importantly, the world is silent and the killings in Taraba State are being relegated to the background.